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Volume 25 SPRING 1950 Number 3
FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE-
A SECOND CLASS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
CHARLES A. REYNARD*
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.-United States
Constitution, Fourth Amendment.
One hundred and sixty years after the adoption of this constitutional
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, Mr. Justice Jackson felt
compelled to conclude:
We cannot give some constitutional rights a preferred position
without relegating others to a deferred position; we can establish no
first without thereby establishing seconds. Indications are not
wanting that Fourth Amendment freedoms are tacitly marked as
secondary rights, to be relegated to a deferred position.'
Contemporaneous support for his observation was supplied the same day he
made it by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wolf v. Colorado,2
in which result Mr. Justice Jackson, ironically, agreed. The Wolf decision
severely restricted the availability of the right of privacy from unreasonable
searches and seizures by regarding as not within the Amendment's prohibition
the action of state courts in admitting in evidence the fruits of such activity.,
Even more recent confirmation of Mr. Justice Jackson's apprehension is to be
found in the decision in United States v. Rabinowitz4 which, despite the
absence of a search warrant, condones a virtual search at large of premises
when accompanied by an arrest in them.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 180
(1949). It seems unnecessary to accept Mr. Justice Jackson's "preference" premise in
order to agree that evidence abounds to support his principal observation concerning
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
2. 338 U. S. 25 (1949), discussed in detail infra p. 308 et seq.
3. See Frank, The United States Supreme Court: X948-1949, 17 U. oF GET. L. REv. 1,
32 (1949), commenting in part: "In ...Wolf v. Colorado, the majority, like an army
on parade, marched impressively up the field and then came back again to where they
had started. If the figure may be pursued, the parade was magnificent, but the enemy
remained unscathed."
4. - U. S. - , 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (Decided February 20, 1950), discussed in detail
infra p. 302 et seq.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Wolf and Rabinowitz decisions seem to have brought the Court to
a kind of terminal point in the forging of the law of searches and seizures,
and it is the writer's purpose to explore the question of whether these two
cases, as well as others recently decided, support Mr. Justice Jackson's thesis
that Fourth Amendment freedoms have become second class constitutional
rights.
The Fourth Amendment, like the other provisions comprising the Bill
of Rights, is not self-executing. These provisions are made meaningful and
become the real bulwarks of protection they were intended to be only as they
are implemented by law, whether it be by legislative action or judicial decision.
Within the past four years the Supreme Court has considered fourteen cases
presenting Fourth Amendment issues. Each of these decisions has been by
a divided Court, frequently closely divided. Despite the apparent lack of
accord among the Justices, and based upon the position taken by the two
newest members of the Court as well as that taken by those whom they re-
placed, predictability of result in future cases seems less hazardous than in the
recent past. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to appraise these recent cases
and their doctrines and to evaluate the criticism that has been levelled against
them, principally by dissenting Justices. 5 It is well to indicate as precisely
as possible the principal area of disagreement. It is one of exceedingly narrow
scope, albeit fundamental in application. Opposed to the majority view in
the Rabinowitz case has been the consistent dissent of Mr. justice Frankfurter
whose thesis is, broadly, that all searches and seizures without a warrant are
"unreasonable" within the contemplation of the Amendment. Narrowing
the area of conflict, however, is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concession that
within narrow limits, and springing from considerations of necessity, some
search and seizure without warrant is permissible. It is the limitations which
he would impose upon this exception-limitations that the majority has been
5. Mr. Justice Jackson's views have already been intimated. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
has consistently" refused to sanction what he regards as inroads upon the Amendment and
his dissenting opinions, frequently supported by elaborate appendices, reflect painstaking
research and reflection upon the subject. Mr. Justice Murphy consistently voted with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, as did Mr. Justice Rutledge on all but one occasion in the
seven cases mentioned (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949)). The position
of Mr. Justice Douglas is much more uncertain, and it was his shifting vote in the cases
through the 1948 term that resolved the conflict of views shared on the one hand by
Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, Jackson and Rutledge, and on -the other, by Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson and Justices Black, Reed and Burton. The reconstituted Court seems to
leave Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in a clear minority to decry encroachments upon
the Amendment, with the new Justices, Clark and Minton aligned with the Vinson-Black-
Reed-Burton view. Speculation would indicate that Mr. Justice Douglas, who did not
participate in Rabinowitz, might have joined Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in dissent
because of the position he had taken in Trupiano. Mr. Justice Black who dissented in
Rabinowitz did so only because of policy considerations involved in the judicial adminis-
tration of the Trupiano rule (a case in which he dissented) and was not concerned with
the construction of the Amendment in the light of the facts of the case.
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unwilling to accept-which, on the surface at least, marks the basic difference
between the two groups of Justices. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's limitations
are two: first, a search of the arrested person may be undertaken in order
to protect the arresting officer and to deprive the prisoner of any means of
escape, and second, following as a corollary, "officers may search and seize
not only the things physically on the person arrested, but those within his
immediate physical control '6 Reduced to its lowest terms, the scope of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's exception is to allow such search and seizure as is
necessary to make the arrest effective-and no more. The view which pre-
vailed in Rabinowitz and other recent cases places a much broader construction
on that always elusive term "possession." This is, seemingly, to make the
enforcement of a constitutional right turn within a narrow compass indeed.
It is nevertheless submitted that this is the fundamental point of departure
from which the divergent and important results in the cases are found to
flow. Of course, the language of the cases is not devoted to the mere semantics
of the problem-although scholarly treatises have been penned on the subject
as it has bearing in the field of property.7 Rather, each of the Court's groups
is able to find support for its position from the customary respectable materials
utilized in the course of deciding cases involving constitutional issues. The
majority of the Court in the cases mentioned have found justification for
their judgment in the earlier decisions of the tribunal. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, on the other hand, reads a far different meaning into the Amendment,
based upon the history and contemporaneous expressions of opinion concern-
ing its necessity and purpose at the time of its framing and adoption. He also
disputes the interpretation which the majority places upon the previously
decided cases, showing that with perhaps one exception" the language relied
upon in those decisions has been dicta, and that the single exceptional case
was later most seriously modified by ensuing decisions.
Before any critical appraisal of this conflict may be safely attempted, it
is necessary to turn to the historical aspects of the question to see what
support, if any, may be marshalled for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position.
Then the cases will be considered.
A few other questions should be kept in mind as the review of'history
and litigation is undertaken, for they will be found to have important bearing
on the result. Does the nature or objective of the search have any bearing
on the problem; that is, are some kinds of searches prohibited altogether,
6. United States v. Rabinowitz, - U. S. at - , 70 Sup. Ct. at 438. Similar
acknowledgment of the exemption and like limitations were also made by the Justice in
Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 609 (1946) and in Harris v. United States, 331
U. S. 145, 168 (1947).
7. BROWN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, p. 18; FRYER, READINGS
ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, c. 2 (1938).
8. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927).
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while others, properly safeguarded, are legally permissible? Does the
character of the property seized affect the question; that is, may there be a
legal search for some types of property, but not for others? Is it of any
significance that the person arrested is actively engaged in the commission
of a crime at the very moment of arrest? Finally, does the character of the
individual, or his guilt or innocence have any bearing upon the validity of
the search and seizure conducted incidental to his arrest?
THE HISTORY
It is a commonplace to observe that the objective of the Amendment's
framers was protection against those abuses of which they were aware or had
experienced with respect to the issuance .of general warrants in England and
writs of assistance in the colonies at the time of and just prior to the Revolu-
tion. Like apprehensions of encroachment by despotic government upon all
fundamental rights led to the adoption of the entire Bill of Rights as an
implied, if not expressed, condition to the acceptance and ratification of the
Constitution itself.' More important, for our present purposes, is the less
generally acknowledged, but nevertheless equally accepted fact that the
colonists' resistance to the writs of assistance was "the first in the chain of
events which led directly and irresistibly to revolution and independence."'"
9. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT, pp. 79-82:
Men on all sides contended that, while the first object of a Constitution
was to establish a government, its second object, equally important, must
be to protect the people against the government. That was something
which all history and all human experience had taught.
The first thing that most of the Colonies had done, on separating
from Great Britain, had been to assure to the people a Bill of Rights,
safeguarding against State Legislative despotism those human rights
which they regarded as fundamental. Having protected themselves by
restrictions on the power of their State Legislatures, the people of this
country were in no mood to set up and accept a new National Govern-
ment, without similar checks and restraints. As soon as the proposed
Constitution was published, the demand for a national Bill of Rights
was heard on all sides. It came especially strong from the more radical
and democratic elements in the States, the farmers and the country
people; but it was also supported by professional and mercantile ele-
ments in the towns. * * *
It was not for any mere theory, for a mere doctrinaire adherence to
rhetorical, political shibboleths that these men were contending. They
were thinking of facts, not theories. They had lived through bitter
years, when they had seen Governments, both Royal and State, trample
on the human rights which they and their ancestors in the Colonies and
in England had fought so hard to secure. In the seven years prior to
the signing of the Federal Constitution, they had seen the Legislatures
of four states-New Jersey, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and North
Carolina-deprive their citizens of the right to jury trial in civil cases.
They had seen the State Legislatures of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
other States pass bills of attainder sentencing men to death or banish-
ment without a criminal trial by jury. They had seen the Legislatures of
nearly all the states deprive persons of their property without due
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Certainly therefore, the background, nature and origins of these writs, which
played so important a part in our national history, deserve careful considera-
tion. Professor Lasson in his excellent treatise" has traced the development
in carefully documented chronological detail, and no attempt will be under-
taken to retell that story here except in general outline.
Early traces of the doctrine that "a man's house is his castle" are to be
found in the Bible,'12 and at a later date, with qualifications, in the Roman
law.13  Upon reaching the Anglo-Saxon scene, we find that efforts to found
the right of privacy as early as 1215 upon the provisions of Magna Charta
are largely unavailing. TMadison who took the lead in proposing the Bill of
Rights in the First Congress, and whose proposals contained a definite prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures, acknowledged that England's
"Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of these
rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed."' 14 The
truth of the matter seems to be that in this area, as in so many others, Lord
Coke had seized upon obscure or ambiguous provisions of the Charter 5 to
spell out a natural right of privacy, and his devoted followers had accepted
his construction without questioning its authenticity. "From this viewpoint
more than any other, the Great Charter may be regarded as important in the
background of the principle of reasonable search and seizure."'"
As if to confirm the proposition that Magna Charta did not secure the
Englishman from unreasonable searches and seizures, a long series of legisla-
tive and executive acts of encroachment upon the right of privacy occurred
in the interim between the early years of the fourteenth century and Lord
process, by the passage of laws allowing tender of worthless paper and
other property in payment of debts and judgments. They had seen a
Massachusetts Legislature impair the freedom of the press by confiscatory
taxation. They had seen the Royal Government quarter troops on the
inhabitants in time of peace and deny to the people the right of assembly
and of petition. They had seen the King's officials search their houses
without lawful warrants. They knew that what Government had done
in the past, Government might attempt in the future, whether its ruling
power should be Royal, State, or Nation-K-ing, Governor, Legislature,
or Congress. And they determined that, in America, such ruling power
should be definitely curbed at the outset. There should be no uncontrolled
power in the government of American citizens. Rightly had Jefferson
said, 'an elective despotism was not the government we fought for.'
10. HART, AIERICAN HISTORY LEAFLETS, No. 33, Introduction. See also, LASSON,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 51 (1937).
11. LASSoN, op. cit. supra note 10.
12. LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 13-14, citing Joshua 7:10-26, ibid. 2:1-7,
Genesis 19:4-11, Deuteronomy 24:10 and Exodus 22:2, 3.
13. LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 14-18.
14. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 1st Congress, 1st Session, p. 453.
15. Especially Article 39, later cited and relied upon by Otis in his protests against
writs of assistance in Paxton's case, Quincy's Reports (Mass.) 51, 469-482 (1761).
16. LAssox, op. cit. stepra note 10, at 21.
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Camden's decision in 1765 in the case of Entick v. Carrington,'7 (hereinafter
discussed) a decision now universally regarded as a landmark of English
liberty. Early instances, involving statutes directing innkeepers in special
cases to search their guests for imported money, with an added provision for
officials to keep a check upon the innkeepers by searching their establish-
ments,"8 were expanded to embrace the search of the premises of various
types of tradesmen for adulterated or improperly fabricated merchandise.19
From these early beginnings, there followed during the Elizabethan and Stuart
regimes a constantly recurring resort to searches and seizures authorized by
decrees of the Court of Star Chamber as means of enforcing the laws relating
to the licensing of books and printing and the suppression of religious freedom,
seditious libel and treason." The following is Professor Lasson's description
of these warrants:
No limitations seem to have been observed in giving messengers
powers of search and arrest in ferreting out offenders and evidence.
Persons and places were not necessarily specified, seizure of papers
and effects was indiscriminate, everything was left to the discretion
of the bearer of the warrant. Oath and probable cause, of course,
had no place in such warrants, which were so general that they could
be issued upon the merest rumor with no evidence to support them
and indeed for the very purpose of possibly securing some evidence
in order to support a charge."
As early as 1634 the general warrant, later expressly authorized by
Parliament in conjunction with the customs laws, was being used by authorities
in the enforcement of laws governing religion-in apparent contravention of
existing law at the time.2 In 1627, following Parliament's refusal to levy new
taxes, Charles I levied a tax by prerogative and effected the imprisonment of
delinquents by the device of a warrant, which while naming the person, was
general for failure to specify an offense.3 At about the same time Privy
Council warrants of a general character issued to authorize search for docu-
mentary evidence.'
4
There were, to be sure, periodic instances of recantation when Parlia-
ment sought to halt"' or at least restrict 26 these oppressive practices, leading in
1640 to the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber 27 which had been a principal
17. 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765).
18. 9 Edw. III, St. II, Ch. 11 (1335) ; LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 23.
19. 11 Henry VII, Ch. 14 (1495); 3 Henry VIII, Ch. 14 (1511) ; LASSON, op Cit.
supra note 10, at 23-24.
20. LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 24-27.
21. Id., at 26.
22. Id., at 28.
23. Id., at 29.
24. Id., at 31.
25. 34 Edw. III, Ch. 1 (1360).
26. 4 Henry IV, Ch. 21 (1402).
27. 16 Charles I, Ch. 10 (1640).
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offender. But such legislative reform was short-lived. In 1662 Parliament
enacted three statutes containing search and seizure provisions quite as
sweeping as any previously to be found in Star Chamber decrees. The first
of these was the much maligned tax upon fire hearths and stoves at the annual
rate of two shillings .2  The second was "An act for preventing frauds, and
regulating abuses in his Majesty's customs ' 29  The third, "An act for pre-
venting abuses in printing seditious, treasonable, and unlicensed books and
28. 13 and 14 Charles II, Ch. 10 (1662). The search provisions contained in Sec. 3
read as follows:
And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the respective con-
stables, headboroughs, tythingmen, or other such officers, within whose
limits any such house or edifice charged by this act as aforesaid are,
and the respective treasurers, and other officers of the respective inns of
court, inns of chancery, colleges and other societies aforesaid, shall by
the last day of May, one thousand six hundred sixty and two, require the
several occupiers of every such house, edifice, lodging and chamber
aforesaid, to deliver in to them respectively, accounts in writing as afore-
said under their several and respective hands, of all such hearths and
stoves as aforesaid, as shall be within their respective houses, edifices,
lodgings and chambers, (2) and upon the receipt of the same, or upon
default of such account in writing, or in case there be no occupiers, then
within six days after notice in writing fixt to the door, requiring such
account to be made, the said constables, or other officers respectively as
aforesaid, shall enter into the said respective houses in the daytime, and
compare such accounts, and see whether the same be truly made, or not;
(3) and if no such account be delivered, then shall take information by
their own view, of the number of such hearths and stoves, upon pain that
every constable, treasurer, and other officer aforesaid, who shall neglect
to do the same, shall forfeit for every week he or they shall so neglect,
the sum of five pounds, and for every false return wilfully made con-
trary to this act, he or they shall forfeit and lose for every hearth and
stove so falsely returned or omitted the sum of forty shillings.
29. 13 and 14 Charles II, Ch. 11 (1662). The search and seizure provisions, con-
tained in Sec. 5, read as follows:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That in case after
the clearing of any ship or vessel, by the person or persons which are or
shall be appointed by his Majesty for managing the customs, or any
their deputies, and discharging the watchmen or'tidesmen from attend-
ance thereupon, there shall be found on board such ship or vessel, any
goods, wares or merchandizes, which have been concealed from the
knowledge of the said person or persons which are or shall be so
appointed to manage the customs, and for which the custom, subsidy
and other duties due upon the importation thereof, have not been paid;
then the master, purser or other person taking charge of such ship or
vessel, shall forfeit the sum of one hundred pounds: (2) and it shall
be lawful to or for any person or persons, authorized by writ of assistance
under the seal of his majesty's court of exchequer, to take a constable,
headborough or other publick officer inhabiting near unto the place,
and in the daytime to enter, and go into any house, shop, cellar, ware-
house or room, or other place, and in case of resistance, to break open
doors, chests, trunks and other package, there to seize, and from thence
to bring, any kind of goods or merchandize whatsoever, prohibited
and uncustomed, and to put and secure the same in his majesty's store-
house, in the port next to the place where such seizure shall be made.
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pamphlets, and for regulating of printing and printing presses,' 30 prohibited
the printing of "any heretical, seditious, schismatical or offensive books or
pamphlets, wherein any doctrine or opinion shall be asserted or maintained,
which is contrary to the Christian faith, or the doctrine or discipline of the
Church of England, or which shall or may tend, or to be to the scandal of
religion, or the church, or the government or governors of the church, state
or commonwealth,"31 required the licensing of books, and authorized extensive
searches for and seizures of unlicensed books by king's messengers.3 2 These
statutes and events subsequent to their enactment had important bearing upon
subsequent developments in the law, both in England and America.
Contemporaneously with these legislative and executive activities, the
judiciary was developing the common law along lines more consonant with
the concept of individual freedom and liberty against- unreasonable searches
and seizures in the administration of the law. In the main, it was England's
judges, not its legislators, who fashioned the principle of freedom from these
oppressive practices. A most significant exception occurred in 1679 when
Chief Justice Scroggs advised Charles II that seditious libel could be regarded
as a common law offense, thus enabling the King to continue to use the general
warrant to prolong the enforcement of the provisions of the book-licensing act
30. 13 and 14 Charles II, Ch. 33 (1662).
31. Id., § 2.
32. Id., § 15. The search and seizure provisions contained in § 15 read as follows:
And for the better discovering of printing in corners without licence, be
it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That one or more of the
messengers of his Majesties chamber, by warrant under his Majesties
sign manual, or under the hand of one or more of his Majesties principal
secretaries of state, or the master and wardens of the said company of
stationers, or any one of them, shall have power and authority with a
constable, to take unto them such assistance as they shall think needful,
and at what time they shall think fit, to search all houses and shops
where they shall know, or upon some probable reason suspect any books
or papers to be printed, bound or stitched, especially printing-houses,
booksellers shops and warehouses, and book-binders houses and shops,
and to view there what is imprinting, binding or stitching, and to examine
whether the same be licensed, and to demand a sight of the said license;
(2) and if the said book so imprinting, binding or stitching, shall not be
licensed, then to seize upon so much thereof, as shall be found imprinted,
together with the several offenders, and to bring them before one or
more justices of the peace, who are hereby authorized and required to
commit such offenders to prison, there to remain until they shall be tried
and acquitted, or convicted and punished for the said offences; (3) and
in case the said searchers shall upon their said search, find any book or
books, or part of books unlicensed, which they shall suspect to contain
matters therein contrary to the doctrine or discipline of the church of
England, or against the state and government; then upon such suspicion
to seize upon such book or books, or part of book or books, and to bring
the same unto the said lord archbishop of Canterbury, and lord bishop of
London for the time being, or one of them, or to the secretaries of
state, or one of them respectively, who shall take such further course
for the suppressing thereof, as to them or any of them shall seem fit.
• ,EARCH AND- SEIZURE;
of 1662, notwithstanding its expiration 'and failure of re-enactment due to
Charles' refusal to summon Parliament. One year later, the'House of Com-
mons made this action of Scroggs and his issuance of general warrants pur-
suant thereto one of the grounds upon which it adjudged his impeachment."3
Sir Matthew Hale's work, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, which
is both contemporary3 4 and generally accepted as authoritative,3 ' best reflects
the accepted practice of the courts of' this period concerning the issuance of
warrants in criminal cases. Hale tells us, in the first place, that upon applica-
tion being made to a justice of the peace for a warrant of arrest, "He must
take information of the prosecuter or witness in writing upon oath35 . . . as
well whether a felony were done, as also the causes of his suspicion, for he
is in this case a competent judge of those circumstances, that may induce the
granting of a warrant to arrest. '37  Next, the warrant, when issued, must
"express the name of the party to be taken, for a warrant granted With a
blank and sealed, and after filled up with the name of the party to be taken
is void in law,"38 and, furthermore, "where upon a complaint to a justice of a
robbery he made a warrant to apprehend all persons suspected and bring them
before him, this was ruled a void warrant . . . and was not a sufficient
justification in false imprisonment." 39 And, finally, upon the basis of the
foregoing observations Hale concludes that general warrants were invalid, 40
although acknowledging that there was some support for a contrary view,
based upon current practices of the Crown and some earlier judicial precedents
cited by Dalton.41
Based upon these observations of Hale, we may conclude that at the very
time when the Parliament and the Crown were utilizing the general warrant
and writs of assistance to invade the individual security of person and home,
the common law was at work developing its protection. In the requirement
of oath, probable cause and particularity of person to be apprehended, the
33. LASSO9N, op. cit. supra note 10, at 38.
34. Hale was admitted to Lincolns-Inn on November 28, 1629, became a judge of
Common Pleas in 1653, Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer on November 7,
1660, and Lord Chief Justice of the court of King's Bench on May 18, 1671 from which
position he resigned on February 20, 1676, and died on December 25, 1676. The manu-
script of his work was apparently compiled over the period of his years as practitioner
and judge and it was ordered printed by the House of Commons, November 29, 1680.
35. HOLDSWORTH VI, 574-595 (1871).
36. HALE I, 586 (1736).
37. HALE II, 110 (1736).
38. HALE I, 577.
39. HALE II, 112.
40. HALE II, 580: "... a general warrant upon a complaint of robbery to apprehend
all persons suspected, and to bring them before, etc., was ruled void, and false imprison-
ment lies against him that takes a man upon such a warrant."
41. HALE II, 114: "But the general warrant to search all places, whereof the party and
officer have suspicion, though it be usual, yet it is not so safe upon the reason of justice
Swallowe's case before cited; and yet see precedents of such general warrants. Dalt.
p. 353, 354."
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rules of the common law were sowing the seeds of the Fourth Amendment
as well as building the foundation for English liberty. It was inevitable that
these two opposing ideologies of seventeenth century English government
could not long coexist, but must, sooner or later, collide with the destruction
of one and the survival of the other. And collide they did in a series of
lesser skirmishes on the legislative front" but with finality of result in a
series of judicial proceedings culminating in Entick v. Carrington,43 decided
by the Court of Common Pleas in 1765. Entick had authored an unlicensed
book, "The Monitor or British Freeholder," which offended the government
and was hence regarded as a seditious libel. In keeping with the practice of
continuing the enforcement of the book-licensing act despite its failure to be
re-enacted, the secretary of state issued a warrant directing the king's mes-
sengers to seize Entick and his private books and papers. The warrant, while
specific in naming the person, was general respecting the articles to be taken.
Carrington and three other of the king's messengers, armed with the warrant,
proceeded to Entick's house where, without his consent, they broke and entered
and for four hours ransacked his rooms, chests, drawers, and other property
and carried away several hundred charts and pamphlets. Entwick sued the
messengers in trespass for damages. 44 The defendants asserted that the war-
rant was a complete defense to their actions, 45 thus putting the issue of its
validity squarely before the court. In affirming the action of the trial court
which had resulted in a verdict for Entick in the amount of 6300, the Court of
Common Pleas, through Lord Camden 6 said:
42. LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 40-42.
43. 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765).
44. Entick was no doubt encouraged by John Wilkes' earlier successful prosecution
of an action for damages against Wood, the undersecretary of state, in connection with
Wilkes' publication, THE NORTH BRITON. Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(1763). The warrant there was wholly general because of the anonymity of the author
of the publication. LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 43-44 observes:
Under this 'roving commission,' they proceeded to arrest upon suspicion
no less than forty-nine persons in three days, even taking some from
their beds in the middle of the night.
See also Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K. B. 206, 93 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763) ; Money v. Leach,
3 Burr. 1692, 1742, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1075; 19 HowELL's STATE TRiALs 1001 (1768)
which arose out of the same incident.
45. There was an alternative defense, that the messengers being ministerial officers
and having had no hand in the preparation of the warrant, were to be excused on that
ground. It was denied.
46. Lord Camden, previously Chief Justice Pratt, had sustained the jury's verdict
of £1,000 in favor of Wilkes in the North Briton case, saying:
The defendants claimed a right under precedents to force persons' houses,
break open excritoires, seize their papers, upon a general warrant, where
no inventory is made of the things taken away, and where no offenders'
names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power
given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to
fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can
delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of
every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
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*... if this point should be determined in favour of the jurisdic-
tion, the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom
will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger,
whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even
suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious
libel . . .
This power, so claimed by the secretary of state, is not supported
by one single citation from any law book extant. It is claimed by no
other magistrate in this kingdom but himself: the great executive
hand of criminal justice, the lord chief justice of the court of King's-
bench, chief justice Scroggs excepted, never having assumed this
authority . . .
If this injury falls upon an innocent person, he is as destitute of
remedy as the guilty: and the whole transaction is so guarded against
discovery, that if the officer be disposed to carry off a bank-bill, he
may do it with impunity, since there is no man capable of proving
either the taker or the thing taken.
If it is law it will be found in our books. If it is not to be found
there, it is not law...
I answer [to the defense of long usage and practice in connection
with the general warrant, that] there has been a submission of guilt
and poverty to power and terror of punishment. But it would be
strange doctrine to assert that all the people of this land are bound
to acknowledge that to be universal law which a few criminal book-
sellers have been afraid to dispute.4 7
Thus was the conflict of ideologies, between the Crown and Parliament
on the one hand and the common law on the other, resolved in England. It is
of significance to note that these proceedings grew out of an attempt to
enforce, upon common law principles, the odious provisions of one of the
three statutes passed in 1662. Entick's victory, "regarded as one of the
permanent monuments of the British Constitution," 4 resulted in a definite
change in Parliament's policy and the ultimate abandonment of the general
warrant.49
The American story, while perhaps more important for our purpose, may
nevertheless be more briefly told in the light of the foregoing account of
English history. In the colonies the controversy over unreasonable search
and seizure centered about the enforcement of another of the statutes of
1662, that for "preventing frauds and regulating abuses in his Majesty's
customs; ' ' O and resort to the judicial process here5 did not achieve the
freedom from oppressive practices attained in England by the Entick case.
subject. If higher jurisdictions should declare my opinion erroneous, I
submit as will become me, and kiss the rod; but I must say I shall always
consider it as a rod of iron for the chastisement of the people of Great
Britain.
47. 19 HowEI.L's STAT TRiALS 1063-1068.
48. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886).
49. LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 48-50.
50. 13 and 14 Charles II, Ch. 11 (1662) ; see footnote 42 supra for the enforcement
provisions, relating to search and seizure.
51. Paxton's Case, Quincy's Reports (Mass.) 51 (1761) discussed more fully, infra.
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By an Act of 1696 "for the more effectual preventing of frauds, and
regulating abuses in the plantation trade in America," Parliament had ex-
tended the application of the 1662 statute to ships arriving in and departing
from the colonies, rendering them "subject and liable to the same rules,
visitations, searches, penalties and forfeitures" as in England? 2  Likewise
extended and made applicable in the colonies was the power to search build-
ings for uncustomed goods and to have "the like assistance . . . given to the
said officers in the execution of their office . . as is provided for the
officers in England." Whether this statute accomplished the purpose for
which it was designed, as a strict matter of legal interpretation, seems at
52. 7 and 8 Charles II, Ch. 22 (1696). Sec. 6 is the specific provision, reading as
follows:
And for the more effectual preventing of frauds, and regulating abuses
in the plantation trade in America, be it further enacted by the authority
aforesaid, That all ships coming into, or going out of, any of the said
plantations, and lading or unlading any goods or commodities, whether
the same be his Majesty's ships of war, or merchants ships, and the
masters and commanders thereof, and their ladings, shall be subject and
liable to the same rules, visitations, searches, penalties and forfeitures, as
to the entring, lading or discharging their respective ships and ladings,
as ships and their ladings, and the commanders and masters of ships,
are subject and liable unto in this kingdom, by virtue of an act of parlia-
ment made in the fourteenth year of the reign of King Charles the
Second, intituled, An Act for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in
his Majesty's customs: and that the officers for collecting and managing
his Majesty's revenue and inspecting the plantation trade, any of the
said plantations, shall have the same powers and authorities, for visiting
and searching of ships, and taking their entries, and for seizing and
securing or bringing on shore any of the goods prohibited to be imported
or exported into or out of any the said plantations, or for which any
duties are payable, or ought to have been paid, by any of the before
mentioned acts, as are provided for the officers of the customs in Eng-
land by the said last mentioned act made in the fourteenth year of the
reign of King Charles the Second, and also to enter houses or ware-
houses, to search for and seize any such goods; and that all the
wharfingers, and owners of keys and wharfs, or any lightermen, barge-
men, watermen, porters, or other persons assisting in the conveyance
of such goods, shall be subject to the like pains and penalties, as are
provided by the same act made in the fourteenth year of the reign of
King Charles the Second, in relation to prohibited or uncustomed goods
in this kingdom; and that the like assistance shall be given to the said
officers in the execution of their office, as by the said last mentioned
act is provided for the officers in England; and also that the said of-
ficers shall be subject to the same penalties and forfeitures, for any cor-
ruptions, frauds, connivances, or concealments, in violation of any the
before mentioned laws, as any officers of the customs in England are
liable to, by virtue of the said last mentioned act; and also that in case
any officer or officers in the plantations shall be sued and molested for
any thing done in the execution of their office, the said officer shall and
may plead the general issue, and shall give this or other custom acts in
evidence, and the judge to allow thereof, have and enjoy the like
privileges and advantages, as are allowed by law to the officers of his
Majesty's customs in England.
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best doubtful,' 3 although at present, academic. As a matter of fact the odious
writs of assistance did issue from the colonial courts of several of the colonies.
They took their name from the fact that they commanded all of the king's
representatives and subjects to aid their holders in executing them. The
writs, wholly general as to the persons and places to be searched, and the
things to be seized (beyond the requirement that they be uncustomed goods)
were subject to the further criticism that once issued, they were not return-
able, but remained as continuing licenses in the hands of their holders, expiring
only at the end of six months after the death of the monarch in whose reign
they were issued. They did not, however, authorize arrest, and while vessels
might be searched at any time, buildings, dwellings, storehouses, etc., situated
on land were to be searched only "in the day time."
Following the death of George II and the attendant expiration of out-
standing writs issued during his reign, application was made to the superior
court of Massachusetts for new writs for the customs officials there in 1761.
By this date the smuggling of uncustomed goods, notably sugar and molasses
from the non-British West Indies was no longer the harmless pastime it had
been tolerated to be prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years War between
England and France. 4  England, pressed by the exigencies of war, was
resolved to enforce the provisions of the Molasses Act of 1733 although prior
to 1760 they had been regarded so oppressively obnoxious that they were
"enforced in lax fashion, evaded universally, and merchants resorted to petty
bribery of custom officials."5  The prospect of vigorous enforcement of
this inequitable law, implemented by the writs of assistance, led indignant
Boston merchants to oppose the application for renewal of the writs.
The controversy culminated in the now famous episode of Paxton's Case,"M
53. There are at least two points of doubt concerning the question. In the first place,
the original act of 1662 designated the court of the exchequer as the agency to issue the
writ of assistance; whereas the practice developed in the colonies for the colonial superior
courts to issue the writ. Thatcher made this his principal point of argument in Paxton's
case. See LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 61-62. In the second place, there is real doubt
whether even the orginal act authorized the type of writ that was thereafter issued both
in England as well as the colonies. It has been forcefully argued that the law officer who
was to "assist" was to do no more than witness the search carried on by the custom
official, whereas, in fact, the writs as issued often to all subjects of the king and directed
them actively to engage in the search. Thus the term "writs of assistance" sometimes
appears as "writs of assistants." See DICKERSON, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE AS A CAUSE OF
THE PREVOLUTION, IN THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION-a series of studies in-
scribed to E. B. Greene-40 et seq. (1939).
54. For an excellent account of the economic causes and scope of these activities, see
MCCLELLAN, SMUGGLING IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES (1912).
55. LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 52.
56. Quincy's Reports (Mass.) 51 (1761). John Adams, who was present, made notes
and they are contained in the Appendix to Quincy's Reports (ibid.) pp. 471 et seq. An-
other version, based upon an expansion of Adam's notes, is to be found in II MINOT, His-
TORY OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1748-1765, 87-99. See also COMMAGER, DOCUIENTS OF AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 45.
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in which James Otis, representing the merchants, made his impassioned
denunciation of the general warrant. Although no formal or official text of
the argument was made or preserved, a number of unofficial versions pre-
pared by contemporaries trace the development of Otis' argument. It pro-
ceeded upon the basis, later to be adopted by England's Court of Common
Pleas in the Entick case with respect to the general warrants, that the writs
of assistance were unknown to the common law (except for Scrogg's aberra-
tion, which he acknowledged) which sanctioned only special warrants, and
then only "for flagrant crimes and in cases of great public necessity . . . upon
process and oath . . . sworn to be suspected and good grounds of suspicion
appearing." He contended also, concerning the permanency of the writs,
that "If an officer will justify under a writ, he must return it." He insisted
that the original Act of 1662 did not authorize the issuance of writs in the
broad form that had developed in usage, but that customs officials were
restricted to the use of the special writ authorized by an earlier statute of
1660.17 And finally, in the alternative, he urged that if the act authorized
these writs, it was void because opposed to Magna Charta and Coke's dictum
in Dr. Bonham's Case, that "An act against the Constitution is void."
At the conclusion of the argument in February of 1761 decision was post-
poned to enable the court to obtain information from England concerning the
precise nature of the practice of the court of exchequer there in such matters.
In December of the same year, however, new writs were granted to Paxton
on the basis of the information thus received. 8
Despite the fact that he lost his case, Otis' argument is consistently cited,
both in historical literature," as well as in the cases arising under the Fourth
Amendment,6" in support of the proposition that the writs of assistance were
a principal contributing cause of the revolution. John Adams, then a young
man and a spectator at the argument, reported more than fifty years later:
I do say in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Otis' oration against
the writs of assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life.6'
[Otis] was a flame of fire! Every man of a crowded audience
57. 12 Charles II, Ch. 19 (1661).
58. For an interesting account of what transpired in connection with the inquiry
directed to England and the reply, see LASSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 62-63.
59. "American histories without exceptions list writs of assistance as one of the
active causes of the American Revolution. An examination of the treatment of this
topic reveals that most of the material is drawn from Massachusetts experience and
centers around the agitation in 1761 and especially the part taken by James Otis in that
affair." DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 53.
60. Otis' speech is expressly referred to in the following cases, Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. at 625, Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. at 195 and in the dissenting
opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. at 604, Harris
v. United States, 331 U. S. at 157, and United States v. Rabinowitz, - U. S. at ,
70 Sup. Ct. at 436.
61. X ADAM'S WoRKS 276, a letter to H. Niles.
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appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against
Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the first scene of opposi-
tion to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the
child Independence was born. In 15 years, namely in 1776, he grew
to manhood, and declared himself free.62
Yet, the skeptical may ask, why was revolution prolonged fifteen years
if resistance to these burdensome writs had reached such a fevered pitch in
1761 ? And why is it there is no more tangible evidence of uniform resistance
of a similar character outside the Massachusetts colony? History tells us that
the writs did in fact continue to issue from at least some of the colonial courts
and were used to enforce even more burdensome customs and taxes in sub-
sequent years prior to the Revolution.03 And we know further that smuggling
continued in the colonies in evasion of these heavy customs duties." The
answer to these questions is not easily obtainable, but the notion nevertheless
persists that there was opposition to the writs, else why was unreasonable
search and seizure made the entire subject of a single amendment when other
highly cherished freedoms, such as those relating to speech, religion, press
and trial by jury were lumped in together with others when the Bill of Rights
was drafted? The true answer to these quesitons seems to be disclosed by
Professor Dickerson in his comparatively recent study6" indicating that the
resistance was converted into a sort of judicial "underground" movement
following the Massachusetts incident, with the colonial courts playing the part
of the opposition by simply failing to act upon or by actually denying the
applications for the writs when made by the customs officials. Apparently
the writs were never applied for in New Jersey or North Carolina. Massa-
chusetts, as already indicated, issued the writs in the Paxton case, and New
Hampshire and New York followed her lead. The judges of the other colonial
courts, however, were more impressed with the merits of Otis' argument, and
there developed a form of judicial opposition ranging from inaction, to pro-
tracted delay, to outright refusal to grant the applications.
The courts of Rhode Island, Connecticut and Maryland simply failed to
take any action with respect to the customs officials' applications; the courts
in Pennsylvania and Delaware, upon being pressed for action by these zealous
officials, denied the applications, and similar denials were also made in later
years in Georgia and Florida following probably a contrary practice at first.
In Virginia the court promptly agreed to issue warrants but directed the
attorney general to prepare one which conformed to its standards of legality.
62. Id., at 247-248, a letter to William Tudor.
63. The Sugar .Act of 1764, The Stamp Act of 1765, The Townshend Acts of 1767
and 1768.
64. M cCLELLAN, SMUGGLING IN THE A-MERICAN COLONIES, Ch. III; LASSON, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 67.
65. DICKERSON, op. cit. sopra note 53, at 40-75.
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The writ thus granted was special and returnable, in the form authorized by
the earlier statute of Charles II which Otis had relied upon in his argument.6
The customs officials found themselves, so equipped, to be seriously impeded
in the effective enforcement of the laws, and made application for a writ in
the usual form in which it issued in England. Their new applications were
denied and correspondence with the King's Attorney General in England
ensued. In a long and revealing letter of reply,". the Attorney General advised
the customs officials of the law as it was construed and applied in England
authorizing the writ, and directed them to re-apply for the broader writ which
was again and emphatically denied by the Virginia court.
Although it appears that there was a considerable element of spontaneity
surrounding this pattern of judicial resistance to applications for the writs,
based upon judicial conceptions of their fundamental illegality, there is also
some evidence of concert of action. Chief Justice Trumbull of the Connecticut
court "entered into correspondence with judges in other colonies to find out
how they proposed to rule on the question. Some of his letters indicate that
this correspondence was intended to unite all the courts in America in uniform
opposition." 6
Thus it was that the opposition to the writs was transferred from the
comparative notoriety of the open courtroom of Otis' day69 to the more quiet
and secluded inner sanctums of judges' chambers, the offices of attorneys
general and clerks of courts in the years that followed. So effective had this
opposition become that Dickerson concludes, "The evidence indicates that the
outbreak of the Revolutionary War alone averted efforts to secure judicial
changes that would have forced American judges to comply with the official
British interpretation of law."'7 0  In this manner the opposition to the writs
66. See note 57 supra.
67. The letter of opinion concludes with the following paragraph:
The Supreme Court of Virginia seems to have proceeded upon a mere
mistake of the law. They have issued an illegal warrant, proceeded on an
obsolete law, the 12 C 2 c 19; at the same time refusing to issue a lawful
one on 13th C 2 c 11 not observing as it would seem, that the first Act
has a different object, and proceeds by different means. These were
found useless and inconvenient, and to remedy the mischief, the second
act was made on which the present Writ of Assistance in England is
founded. This kind of' authority has been in constant use above a
century, has often been recognized and confirmed by judicial decisions;
and it seems strange indeed, that any judge in the colonies should think
the laws of the mother too harsh for the temper of American Liberty.
I am therefore inclined to suppose that they proceed upon a mere mis-
take of the Law.
DICKERSON, op. cit., supra note 53, at 70-71.
68. Id., at 53. See also p. 63.
69. There is even reason to speculate concerning the degree of publicity accorded
Otis' famous speech, since it was delivered in a small courtroom, attended by compara-
tively few persons and not reported in the press at the time. See DICKERSON, op. cit.
supra note 53, at 42-43.
70. Id. at 75.
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was effectively continued, with the leading roles being played by lawyers and
observed by lawyers-a group which later had a very substantial part in the
drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In fact Chief Justice
Trumbull, his judicial colleague, Roger Sherman, and William S. Johnson,
Connecticut's colonial agent in London, between whom correspondence passed
concerning the writs, were all three elected to the First Congress which pro-
posed the Fourth Amendment.
7 1
Based upon the history reviewed to this point there seems little doubt
that the Fourth Amendment's framers had at least two objectives in mind
as they approached their task. First, they clearly intended to prohibit the use
of general warrants and writs of assistance as means of law enforcement;
and, second, in the fulfillment of this end, they intended that the guilty should
be protected as well as the innocent. In fact, it is not too much to say that
protection of the guilty was a matter of particular concern. Wilkes and Entick
were harrassed by general warrants because of their publication of seditious
libels; and the American colonists were being similarly harrassed by the writs
of assistance in connection with their smuggling activities in violation of
existing customs laws. It is true, of course, that these laws were considered
burdensome and oppressive, but nevertheless, they were the valid and existing
laws of the land -7 2 to be obeyed, altered or repealed by orderly political pro-
cesses, or rendered inapplicable by revolution.
With at least this much of an objective in mind the members of the
First Congress set about their task. Was the goal accomplished? It is sub-
mitted that it was, and a great deal inore! On August 17, 1789, the House
of Representatives, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, came to consider
the proposal that ultimately emerged as the Fourth Amendment, which read
as follows :
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects; shall not be violated by warrants issuing without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
73
At this point Gerry objected to what he presumed to be a mistake in the open-
ing phrase and proposed its amendment to read "The right of the people to be
secure, in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
71. I BENTON, ABRIDGMdENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 20.
72. Some doubt exists concerning the validity of the seditious libel laws under which
Wilkes and Entick were prosecuted in view of the expiration of the statute creating them
and their extremely tenuous common law footing at the date in question. It is probable,
however, that their offenses were common law crimes. See VIII HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLI SH LAw 336-346 (1871).
73. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 1st Congress, 1st Session, p. 783.
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seizures and searches" etc.74 (emphasis added) The amendment carried,
and then:
Mr. Benson objected to the words 'by warrants issuing.' This
declaratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought it
was not sufficient; he therefore proposed to alter it so as to read 'and
no warrant shall issue.'
The question was put on this motion, and lost by a considerable
majority.7 5
Nevertheless, on August 24, when the Committee of Three, appointed to
arrange the amendments as agreed upon, Benson, as its chairman reported
the Fourth in the form in which his motion would have cast it, but which had
been defeated. The change apparently went unnoticed, and as the Amend-
ment, so worded, was adopted by the Senate, with the House thereafter con-
curring on the full bill of ten amendments, it became a part of the Constitu-
tion when ratified by the states, notwithstanding the rejection of Benson's
proposal by the House when originally made.
The significance of this incident is extremely far reaching, as Benson
himself contemplated. The amendment as first proposed did no more than
protect the people against the evils of general warrants and writs of assistance
by prescribing the basic elements of a valid warrant. Even the Gerry amend-
ment's reference to "unreasonable seizures and searches" was simply "declara-
tory," and while "good as far as it went," it failed to go far enough to accom-
plish Benson's purposes, namely to create two distinct rights rather than one.
His proposal has the necessary effect of creating a wholly independent right of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, completely separate from
the designation of requirements for valid warrants; the Amendment in the
form adopted contains these two clauses rather than the single one in which
form it originated. Thus it came to pass that the Amendment offers two
guarantees: one that all warrants shall hereafter be specially issued under
the safeguard of oath, probable cause and particularity plus the other, that
no searches or seizures shall be made, even with an otherwise valid warrant,
if they are unreasonable.
The significance of this "double barrelled" aspect of the Amendment
has not been overlooked by the commentators. It has been asserted that in
practical application: (1) the Amendment's first clause prohibits a search for
mere evidence even though the warrant authorizing it be valid, and (2) the
second clause prohibits the seizure of persons or property (a) without a war-
rant, or (b) under a warrant authorizing the search for and seizure of other
or different persons or property. 6 To what extent have these observations
74. Ibid. 75. Ibid.
76. See Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REv. 361, 366, 379
(1921); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
MicH. L. REv. 1, 15-27 (1931) ; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 424-434 (4th ed.),
610-636 (5th ed.) ; Black, Constitutioial Law 606-616 (1927).
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been confirmed by the courts? For the answer to this question let us turn
now to a consideration of the cases.
THE CASES
For a better analysis of the issues involved, the discussion of the cases
is divided into four sections. The first concerns the application of the
Amendment to individuals in cases where there is no incidental arrest. The
second analyzes the scope of the Amendment as applied to corporations.
The cases involving searches and seizures incidental to arrest are discussed
in the third section. And the fourth treats the remedial problem.7 7
Case Involving Individuals and No Incidental Arrest
Almost a century passed between the ratification of the Amendment
and 1886, when the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States5 rendered the
first important interpretative decision. The principal reason contributing to
the delay undoubtedly is that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-
incrimination, entwined as it is with the Fourth's freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure, was not drawn into question until after the enactment of
federal legislation in 1878, permitting a defendant in a criminal case to testify
at his own request.73 The intermingling of the provisions of the two Amend-
ments is well illustrated by the Boyd case, where the action was for forfeiture
of certain goods alleged to have been imported by the defendants in violation
of the custom law. Pursuant to an act of Congress the government moved
that the defendants be ordered to produce certain documents in their posses-
sion, which if not produced would, under the statute, be conclusively pre-
sumed to contain the matter alleged by the prosecution. It was contended in,
defense that so to compel the defendants to make available their books, papers
and records in a forfeiture proceeding was to compel them to give testimony
against themselves in substantiation of the charges made, contrary to the
Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause. The Court was unanimous in
sustaining the defendants' contentions based on the Fifth Amendment; but
seven of the judges went further, holding that the act of Congress authorized
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment as
77. Literal and precise compartmentalization along the lines indicated. is, of course,.
neither entirely possible nor wholly desirable, and some admixture of the cases will be
found, but in the main, the cases-xvill be taken up and discussed in the order mentioned.
78. 116 U. S. 616 (1886).- 'In two- earlier- decisions the Court had held' that the
Amendment applied only to. criminal, proceedings and had no relation to civil proceedings
for the recovery of delinquent taxes, Murray v. -roboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S.
1855). Cf. District Of' Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D. C. 1949) aff'd on other
grounds, - U. S -- , 70 Sup. Qt, 468 (1950) ; and that letters and packages com-
mitted to the United States mail, and not subject to inspection, could not be opened with-
out a warrant, in re Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877).
79. 20 STAT. 30 (Act of March 16, 1878, c. 37). See Corwin, The Suepreme Court's
Construction of the Self-Incrmindii*4 Claus , 29 Micl. -L.lEv. 1; I1, 13 (1931).
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well. The Court's opinion, written by Mr. Justice Bradley, reviewed the
English and early American history, the Entick case and Otis' argument in
Paxton's Case and observed that, while no physical search or seizure had oc-
curred here, nevertheless, ". . . a compulsory production of a man's private
papers to establish a criminal charge against him or to forfeit his property is
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in all cases in
which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient and
effects the whole object and purpose of search and seizure. ' 's ° And it was
further emphasized that "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property" which lies at the root of the interest intended to be
protected, so that "In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost
into each other."' It is extremely important to note that the Court regarded
the invoice in question as a "private paper" and as such immune from the
constructive search although it was the instrument by which the importation
of the dutiable goods was effected, and by means of which the property sub-
ject to forfeiture would be identified.
Here then, in the first important case arising under the Amendment, is a
clear recognition of complete freedom from search for and seizure of papers
which are sought for the sole purpose of being used as evidence to establish
proof of the commission of an offense. Such a search and seizure, although
merely constructive, is unreasonable and prohibited by the first clause of the
Amendment. While no warrant was involved, the case holds that a federal
court, even though authorized by a Congressional act, may not order the
production of documents for the purpose involved in Boyd without infringing
the freedom so protected. But was it to be expected that a search warrant,
executed in accordance with the formalities of the Amendment's second clause,
could accomplish what the order of the trial court in the Boyd case did not?
When finally confronted with this precise question in the Goided case 2 in
1921, the Court answered emphatically in the negative. Gouled was indicted
and convicted of defrauding the government in connection with certain con-
tracts to furnish clothing to the Army. A search warrant, properly executed,
had issued prior to the indictment and in the course of the execution of it,
federal officials had seized copies of contracts and a bill for attorney's fees
alleged to have connection with the fraud. No question was raised concerning
the sufficiency of the warrant to cover the search for and seizure of these
papers. The following question was certified by the circuit court of appeals:
"Are papers of no pecuniary value but possessing evidential value against
80. 116 U. S. at 622. ,
81. Id. at 630.
82. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S.- 298 (1921).
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persons presently suspected and subsequently indicted * * * when taken
under search warrants issued [under the Search Warrant Act of 1917] from
the house or office of the person so suspected,-seized and taken in violation
of the 4th Amendment ?' 3 The Court stated that "the answer to the question
must be in the affirmative.18 4 The government had argued that the Con-
gressional act expressly authorized search warrants for property which had
been used in the commission of a felony. It was argued, and the Court
acknowledged, that property such as counterfeit coin, burglars' tools and
weapons, implements of gambling and the like might be seized under properly
executed search warrants. However, the Court regarded the use of warrants
in such cases to be limited to situations in which "a primary right to such
search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the
complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession
of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.
Boyd Case, pp. 623, 624."11 While denying the existence of such a situation
in Gouded, the Court said: "we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used
as instruments or agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the Government as
to give the public an interest in them which would justify the search for and
seizure of them, under a properly issued search warrant, for the purpose of
preventing further frauds."8 6 (emphasis added) Indeed, had the govern-
ment's theory concerning the nature of the papers in Gouled been sustained,
it would have necessitated the overruling of the Boyd case, since the invoice
in question there was just as much an instrument of the crime as the contracts
and fee bill in Gouled. The importance of this point must not be overlooked,
and it will be alluded to again momentarily.
A second issue in the Goded case involved other papers taken without the
sanction of a warrant at all, but by stealth on the part of a federal representa-
tive who was a business acquaintance of the defendant, sent to the defendant's
place of business under instructions of his superior officers, pretending to
make a friendly call. In the light of the history, purpose and language of the
Amendment, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that its provisions
run not only to searches and seizures accompanied by force and violence, but
extend as well to those accomplished by stealth or compromise of friendship.
In the Am1os87 and Silverthorne88 cases, decided substantially contemporane-
ously with Gouled, and in the earlier case of Weeks v. United States,89 the
83. 255 U. S. at 309-310.
84. Id. at 311.
85. Id. at 309.
86. Ibid.
87. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921).
88. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
89. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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Court reached similar conclusions respecting evidence obtained without war-
rants or orders of any kind. In the Amos case, federal officers had called at
the defendant's home during his absence and upon identifying themselves,
were admitted by "a woman who said she was his wife."9  They thereupon
proceeded to make a thorough search of the premises and found and seized a
quantity of illicit liquor. Defendant's seasonable motion for the return of
the liquor was denied, it was offered in evidence at the trial of his indictment
for its possession, and he was convicted. The Court reversed the conviction
with the statement that the search and seizure was "in plain violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments."'" The Silverthorne case is only slightly more
complicated. There a father and his son were arrested at their home, and
while in custody, federal officials went to the office of a corporation, of
which they were apparently officers, and without any warrants or authority
whatsoever, took all books, papers and records to be found. A motion for the
return of these documents was made, and was opposed by the Government;
while the motion was pending, photographs and copies of all the papers were
made and new indictment was prepared against the defendants on the basis
of the information so obtained. The court subsequently ordered the return
of all the papers, and thereafter issued a subpoena ordering the defendants to
produce the originals in the course of the new prosecution. Upon their refusal
to do so, they were punished for contempt. The Supreme Court reversed,
admonishing the Government that it may not do indirectly what the Amend-
ment forbids to be done directly:
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that
although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government
now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy
them, and then may use the knowledge it has gained to call upon
the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protec-.
tion of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any
advantages that the Gbvernment can gain over the object of its
pursuit by doing the forbidden act. * * * In our opinion such is not
the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.9 2
It was likewise acknowledged here as it has been in other cases both
before and since, that corporations are, with some limitations not applicable
to individuals, protected by the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause
despite their inability to invoke the Fifth Amendment's guaranty against,
self-incrimination 98
90. There is nothing further in the report to shed any light upon the intriguing
possibilities suggested by this designation.
91. 255 U. S. at 315-316.
92. 251 U. S. at 391-392.
93. The history of corporate experience with the Fourth Amendment is a story com-
plete in itself, anti no attdmpt is made to treat it here. The following cases should be
consulted. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 75 (1906) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S.
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The Weeks case had presented a Silverthorne situation in reverse. There
the defendant was arrested at his place of business on a charge of having
used the mails for the transportation of lottery tickets and simultaneously
another group of federal officers searched his home without a warrant seizing
a large number of articles including both personal effects as well as certain
lottery tickets, the subject of the offense charged. The Court held it was
error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion for the return of all
these articles-including the contraband tickets since the search was conducted
without a warrant.
One further case that must be considered at least in part here is Marron
v. United States94 although, involving as it does a seizure incidental to arrest,
it will reappear in the discussion in the next section where it plays a more
important role. In 'l/Iarron, federal prohibition officers, armed with a valid
warrant to search for and seize "intoxicating liquors and articles for their
manufacture," went to the defendant's place of business for the purpose of
executing the writ, and while there observed the defendant in the act of
making illegal sales of liquor. The defendant was arrested, having committed
a felony in the presence of the officers, and the search proceeded, resulting
in the seizure, not merely of liquors, as described in the warrant, but of "a
ledger showing inventories of liquors, receipts, expenses, including gifts
to police officers and other things relating to the business" as well as certain
bills "for gas, electric light, water and telephone service furnished on the
premises." A motion for the return of the ledger and bills was denied, they
were offered in evidence at the trial and a conviction resulted. In reviewing
the action of the trial court, Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous
Court, said:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things
to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and pre-
vents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.
As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant. * * * And it is clear that the seizure
of the ledger and bills, in the case now under consideration, was not
authorized by the warrant."
If we halt our examination of the cases at this point and seek to formulate
a rule, or rules from the five decisions just considered, for the purpose of
appraising the recent activity of the Court, it would seem that we might con-
clude that: (1) Searches for and seizures of property of any kind (i.e., con-
traband articles such as illicit liquor and lottery tickets, as well as harmless
36f (1911); Essgee Co. 1. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923); Federal Trade Com-
mission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924) ; Brown v. United States, 276
U. S. 134 (1928) ; Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946).
94. 275 U. S. 192 (1927).
95. Id. at 196, 198. However, the Court did sustain the validity of the seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest. This aspect of the casd is treated in the next section.
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personal papers or chattels) are forbidden when undertaken without a war-
rant-Weeks, Anos, Silverthorne and Gouled (in part); (2) Searches for
and seizures of goods of one description are prohibited under a valid warrant
authorizing the seizure of goods of another description-Marron; and (3)
Searches for and seizures of property which has evidential value only are
prohibited, even though undertaken pursuant to (a) a court order based upon
statute-Boyd, or (b) a valid warrant-Gouled. It is in the formulation and
application of the first and third rules that principal difficulty is encountered
when the recent decisions of the Court are considered.
The most difficult case to reconcile with the rules is the 1946 four to
three decision in Zap v. United States.96 Zap had been awarded a Navy
contract to conduct test flights and perform other experimental aeronautical
work. He hired a test pilot to do the actual flying, had him endorse a check
in blank which Zap later filled in for $4,000 and reported as an item of expense
on his cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, although the test pilot was actually paid
only $2,500. While inspecting Zap's accounts agents of the Navy and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation discovered this fraud, and the cancelled check
was taken and later introduced in evidence at Zap's trial after he had unsuc-
cessfully moved for its return. Both the conviction and the action of the
trial court in refusing to order the return of the check were affirmed. Con-
ceding the check was taken without a valid warrant,"7 the Court held that
the search being legal (Zap is said to have consented to an inspection as a
condition of the award of the contract), the officers might have testified
concerning what they saw in the course thereof and, further, "Had the check
been returned to petitioner on the motion to suppress, a warrant for it could
have been immediately issued,""8 citing the Search Warrant Act of 1917,"9
the very provision upon which the government had relied in its unsuccessful
argument in the Gouled case. The two cases are so much alike on their facts
it would be expected that Gouled would have been overruled or at least dis-
cussed, but it is not even cited-by majority or dissent. Certainly if the
contract and fee bill in Gouled, seized under a properly executed warrant,
could not be offered in evidence, it is hard to see why the cancelled check in
Zap, seized without a warrant, could be so used. The majority's statement
that it could have been seized under a proper warrant on the theory that it
was property used "as the means of committing a felony" overlooks two very
important facts, (1) -that it was not seized in this fashion, and (2) that the
96. 328 U. S. 624- (1946). Justices Black, Reed and Burton- joined with Douglas
who wrote the majority opinion. Justices Murphy and Rutledge concurred in Frank-
furter's dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson did not participate and the vacancy created
by the death of Chief- Justice Stone. had not been filled.
97. Id. at 628, n. 5.
98. Id. at 629. "
99. 40 STAT. 228; 18 U: S. C. §:612.
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Court had considered this very argument in Gouled where similar documents
had been seized under a valid warrant and had rejected it. Two questions beg
to be answered: (1) where was the "properly issued warrant," and (2) what
further frauds could Zap have perpetrated with his cancelled check?
11n the light of the decision in Zap, let us briefly re-examine the cases
upon which the rules were formulated in order to determine the extent to
which inroads have been made upon them. Rule one forbids the search and seiz-
ure of property of any kind without a valid warrant, whether it be private
papers of the most personal sort; corporate or individual papers having some
relation to the commission of an offense, as in Silverthorne and Gouled; or ac-
tual contraband items, such as the illicit liquor in Amos, or the lottery tickets in
Weeks, possession of which is itself a crime, or which, in the public interest
may be searched for and seized under a valid warrant issued in accordance
with the safeguards imposed by the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Zap
expressed no affirmative purpose to overrule these long-standing authorities
interpreting and applying the Amendment's terms, but it is submitted that to
condone failure to resort to warrant procedure simply because the officers
were lawfully aware of the existence of Zap's check, is tantamount to the
same thing. The officers in Weeks, Amos, Gouled and Silverthorne lawfully
knew (or at least had sufficient information for obtaining warrants) of the
existence of the property seized in those cases, but their failure to secure
warrants resulted in the exclusion of the property seized as evidence in those
cases. The significance of the Court's departure from the principles of the
Amendment as construed by these earlier cases was forcefully called to its
attention by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in the Davis
case, decided the same day, when he cautioned that:
It is important to keep clear the distinction between prohibited
searches on the one hand and improper seizures on the other. See
Mr. Justice Miller, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638, 641.
Thus it is unconstitutional to seize a person's private papers, though
the search in which they were recovered was perfectly proper. E.g.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298. It is unconstitutional to
make an improper search even for articles that are appropriately
subject to seizure, e.g. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1.
And a search may be improper because of the object it seeks to un-
cover, e.g. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-394, or because
its scope extends beyond constitutional bounds, e.g. Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20.100
The Court has indeed blurred the distinctions to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter
refers, and by so doing, has substantially restricted the scope of operation of
rule one. The extent of this, restriction depends largely upon the nature
of the limitations which Zap imposes on .rule three.
100. 328 U. S. at 61Z.
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Rule three prohibits searches for and seizures of property which has
evidential value only, even though undertaken pursuant to either a court
order based on a statute, as in Boyd, or under a valid warrant, as in Gouled
(as to the contracts and the fee-bill). Accordingly, as to this phase of our
examination of Zap we may assume the validity of the Court's premise that
the search was properly authorized, and limit our inquiry to the single issue
whether the seizure of the cancelled check was lawful. The constructive
search in Boyd as well as the physical search and seizure in Gouled were like-
wise properly authorized, but in both cases the objects of the search were
held to be within the Fourth Amendment's protection and hence immune from
seizure.
In Boyd, it will be recalled, the court regarded the invoice as a "private
paper," and concluded that it could not be seized, while acknowledging that
other types of property might be, in the following language:
The principal question, however, remains to be considered. Is a
search and seizure, or what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory pro-
duction of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him
in a proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged fraud against the
revenue laws-is such a proceeding for such a purpose an 'unreason-
able search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Constitution? or, is it a legitimate proceeding? It is
contended by the counsel for the government, that it is a legitimate
proceeding, sanctioned by long usage, and the authority of judicial
decision. No doubt long usage, acquiesced in by the courts, goes a
long way to prove that there is some plausible ground or reason for
it in the law, or in the historical facts which have imposed a
particular construction of the law favorable to such usage. . . . But
we do not find any long usage, or any contemporary construction
of the Constitution, which would justify any of the acts of Congress
now under consideration. As before stated, the act of 1863 was the
first act in this country, and we might say, either in this country or
in England, so far as we have been able to ascertain, which authorized
the search and seizure of a man's private papers, or the compulsory
production of them, for the purpose of using them in evidence against
him in a criminal case, or in a proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of
his property. Even the act under which the obnoxious writs of
assistance were issued did not go as far as this, but only authorized
the examination of ships and vessels, and persons found therein, for
the purpose of finding goods prohibited to be imported or exported,
or on which the duties were not paid, and to enter into and search any
suspected vaults, cellars, or warehouses; for such goods. The search
for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties
and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally. different
things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and
papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained,
or of using them as evidence against him.. The two things -differ
toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to:the possession
of the property; in the other it is not. The seizure of stolen goods
is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited
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for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties
payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least
two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our
own revenue acts from the commencement of the government.101
The Court seemingly overlooked the fact, noted by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. United States,10 2 that the invoice
was a record required by law to be kept, and was, to that extent at least, a
record in which the public had an interest. Thirty-five years later in the
Gouled case, the Court referring to the Boyd passage quoted above, had
intimated that papers or records in which the public had such an interest
might be seized in the course of a properly safeguarded search "for the
purpose of preventing further frauds." While, as previously stated, it is
difficult to envision just what further frauds Zap could have perpetrated
with his cancelled check, it must be conceded that it was a paper or record
in which the public had an interest, and to that extent had significance beyond
its mere evidential value to the prosecution. Certainly, it more nearly fits
the description of an "instrument used for the commission of a felony," than
the invoice in Boyd. MQre doubt arises concerning its closer approximation
of that phrase than the papers seized in Gouled, but even there the metaphor
was more strained.
Rule three, therefore, upon close examination would seem to have
survived Zap with only slight, if any, damage. Books, papers or documents,
which are used as the means of committing a felony, take their place along
side of contraband, and may be seized because in addition to their value as
evidence, there is a coexisting public interest in them, provided the extortion
is authorized by law. Was there such authorization in Zap. The majority
pointed to the statutes authorizing the inspection and audit of government
contractors' books' 03 -but the provisions of these acts simply authorize a
"search" and make no provision respecting seizure. It was at this point, of
course, that rule one prohibiting any seizure without a warrant was violated,
as previously discussed. However, a modification of rule two, or a variation
of it, also occurred at this juncture.
Rule two, it will be recalled, forbids searches for and seizures of
property of one description under valid warrants authorizing the seizure of
another. Here we were confronted with a valid search, authorized by law,
rather than a specific warrant which conferred no power of seizure whatso-
ever. Certainly, it must be admitted that, "If . . . a search instituted under
the legal process of a warrant, which also authorizes seizure, does not permit
101. 116 U. S. at 622.
102. 335 U. S. 1, 67 (1948).
103. Act of July 2, 1926; 44 STAT. 787, § 10(b), U. S. C. § 310(1). Title
XIII, § 1301, Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942, 56 STAT. 185, 50 U. S. C.
App. Supp. IV, § 643.
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seizure of articles other than those specified (as in Marron, then) statutory
and contractual authority merely to search cannot be sufficient to grant that
power." 104
Summarizing the discussion of this section, it may be said that the
principles established by the non-arrest cases in the period between 1886
and 1927 were, in 1946, being subjected to serious limitations, primarily as
a result of the decision in Zap. Rule three had been modified to place what
had theretofore been regarded as personal papers, on the same footing as con-
traband articles, and to the extent of that modification, rules one and two
were being ignored.
Cases Involving Corporations
Of the fourteen post-1945 cases arising under the Fourth Amendment,
three involved corporations which were required to submit corporate data in
response to governmental demands-warrants were not involved in any of the
cases. All three of the cases raise a question concerning the application of the
third rule just set forth, since they compelled the production of corporate
records to be used as evidence in proceedings directed toward the enforce-
ment of federal laws.
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,"0 5 the Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor had issued his
administrative subpoena to the defendant, ordering it to produce certain
records required by the Wage-Hour Law to be kept by all employers subject
to its provisions. Following the defendant's refusal to produce the records,
the Administrator, in accordance with statutory prescription, had applied to
a federal district court for an order compelling obedience to the subpoena.
The Court affirmed the action of the lower courts in granting the application
over the defendant's objections based, inter alia, on the Fourth Amendment's
search and seizure provisions. Said Mr. Justice Rutledge:
The short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the
records in these cases present no question of actual search and
seizure, but raise only the question whether orders of court for the
production of specified records have been validly made; and no
sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer
or other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises against their
will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or
papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of
court authorized by law and made after adequate opportunity to pre-
sent objections which in fact were made. Nor has any objection
been taken to the breadth of the subpoenas or to any other specific
defect which could invalidate them.10 6
104. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. at 632 (1945).
105. 327 U. S. 186 (1946).
106. Id. at 195.
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Of course, such a "short answer" might have been given in the Boyd case,
but was not as we have already seen-and this was realized by Mr. Justice
Rutledge who then proceeded with his treatment of the case in detail-a
treatment which fills twenty-two pages of the reports. The Boyd case, of
course, was distinguishable since it involved the Fifth Amendment's self-
incrimination clause, not applicable to the corporate defendants here. There
was, however, language as well as express rulings in the cases to the effect
that the Fourth Amendment's freedoms were not wholly unavailable to
corporations, and it was with respect to the limits of this doctrine that Mr.
Justice Rutledge addressed himself, ultimately concluding that in such cases
its protection "if applicable, at the most guards against abuse only by way of
too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by
law to make and the materials specified are relevant."1-0 7 The requirement of
"probable cause" he held to be satisfied "in that of an order for production
by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress,
is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant'
to the inquiry."108
In United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 0 9 corporate records had been
subpoenaed and presented before a grand jury which thereafter returned an
indictment against the corporation for violations of the anti-trust laws. The
indictment was subsequently dismissed because women had been systematically
excluded from the grand jury panel. Upon the dismissal, the Court granted
the corporation's motion for the return of the records which had, in the
interim, been copied and photostated by the government. Thereafter the
government instituted the present case, a civil proceeding to restrain violations
of the anti-trust laws, and sought by a subpoena to compel the production of
the records for use as evidence in the case. A motion to quash the subpoena
on the theory that it was forbidden by the decision in the Silverthorne case
was sustained by the trial court but reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal.
The cases are clearly distinguishable, as the Court remarked-the government
in this case having had valid and legal possession of the records at the time
the copies were made, whereas the Silverthorne records were obtained without
shadow of legal right. On the broader question-whether the judicial process
by which the records were obtained in the first place violates the third rule
set out above-the Court, acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment affords
some protection to corporations, alluded to the restrictions which have been
placed upon that protection by its decision in Oklahoma Press, none of which
were alleged to have been infringed here. In United States v. Morton Salt
107. 327 U. S. at 208.
108. Id. at 209.
109. 336 U. S. 793 (1949).
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Co.,11° a corporate defendant in a civil suit was compelled by injunction to
furnish the Federal Trade Commission with reports of its business showing
that it was complying with a cease and desist order previously issued by that
agency. Again the Court referred to the limited nature of the protection
afforded corporations by the Fourth Amendment, and concluded on this
point, that "Even if one were to regard the request for information in this
case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-
enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate
behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." '
If it be conceded that corporations may invoke the protection of the
Amendment, then these cases on their faces seem to do some violence to the
third rule which was extracted from the early case. However, it is submitted
that the results of these cases is wholly consistent with what was said if not
with what was done in Gouled. It will be recalled that the Court there, in
rejecting the government's argument that the papers should be regarded as
property used in the commission of a felony, had expressly reserved judgment
with respect to papers which might be a potential means of continuing fraud.
As such, it was intimated, papers might fall into the general category of
contraband articles, the continuing possession of which is a threat to law and
order, and seizure of which is therefore proper in the public interest. It
would appear that in each of the three corporate cases just discussed, a similar
consideration is present. All three of the cases involved the enforcement of
Congressional acts regulating interstate commerce; Oklahoma Press involved
records which were required to be maintained by law, and which, also by law,
were to be made available in the manner ultimately compelled; Wallace &
Tiernan involved records which were allegedly being used for the continuing
purpose of violating the provisions of the anti-trust laws; and similar records
were involved in Morton Salt (Federal Trade Commission Act). In each
case, therefore, we were confronted with a legislative enactment, which, in
the public interest declared certain acts to be unlawful, and the records in
these cases were the means for the continuing frustration of that policy-
hence subject to seizure in appropriate manner-whether by properly executed
warrant, order of court on application of the enforcement officials, or by
injunction following a hearing. In any case, the hand of a magistrate was
interposed between the law enforcement officer and the defendant's property.
Finally, it is extremely important to detect the note of doubt in the opinions
in all recent cases involving corporations, respecting the broader issue whether
the Amendment was ever in fact intended to apply to corporations. To date
the principle has not been overturned, but restrictions have mounted until,
in contrast with application to individuals, the Amendment truly may be said
110. - U. S. - , 70 Sup. Ct. 357 (1950).
111. Id. at -, 70 Sup. Ct. at 369.
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to pose a dual standard. To the extent to which this principle of limitation as
applied to corporations may inadvertently or subconsciously influence the
Court in its handling of cases involving individuals, it is perhaps desirable
to renounce the principle that the Amendment has any corporate application.
For further evidence of the extent to which the Fourth Amendment's
freedoms have been relegated to second-class constitutional rights, let us turn
now to the cases involving searches and seizures incidental to arrest.
Cases Involving Searches and Seizures Incidental to Arrest
In approaching a consideration of the cases in this section, it should be
recalled that in two of the cases discussed in the first section, searches and
seizures were made chronologically, though not physically, coincidental with
arrests. In Weeks and Silverthorne, defendants were lawfully arrested at
their places of business and their homes, respectively, and in each instance the
homes and offices, again respectively, were simultaneously searched and
articles seized, which, for lack of proper warrants in the hands of the officers,
were required to be returned to their owners. The clear basis of decision
in each case was that the defendant's freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure had been violated by non-compliance with Fourth Amendment require-
ments-regardless of the character of the property seized. In the process of
coming to its decision in the Weeks case, the opinion of the Court contains
the following passage:
What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry
specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state what it
is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Govern-
ment, always recognized under English and American law to search
the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize
the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly
maintained in many cases.' 2
Three important facts should be emphasized concerning this dictum, first,
notwithstanding the reference to "many cases" sustaining the proposition
asserted, the Court cited only two texts and one English decision but no
previous decisions of its own for the good reason that there were none at
this time; second, the suggestion extends only to the search of the person as an
incident of arrest; and third, the Court was clearly stating what the Weeks
issue was not, rather than what it was. When it turned to that issue, "the
right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of
evidence the letters and correspondence [as well as the lottery tickets] of the
accused, seized in his house in his absence and without authority," its
decision was unqualified that "not even an order of court would have justified
such procedure, much less was it within the authority of the United States
Marshal to thus invade the house and privacy of the accused."" 3
112. 232 U. S. at 392.
113. Id. at 393-394.
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The Agnello decision'14 in 1925 added not one whit to the law of the
cases expounding the Fourth Amendment's principles, but did contribute
further, equally irrelevant, dicta to that first announced in the Weeks case.
For our purposes the greatest significance of the Agnello incident is the faith
with which the prosecution not only relied upon the Weeks dictum but sought
to extend it, all to no avail. The facts of the case were these: government
agents, suspecting the defendants of unlawfully selling drugs, employed two
persons to arrange to make a purchase from them, and stood outside the
premises at the appointed time to observe the transaction. Defendant C left
the premises, (for the purpose of obtaining the drug) and was followed by
government agents who observed him enter his own home several blocks
away, emerge therefrom, cross the street and enter defendant A's home.
Both defendants C and A (with others) then emerged from A's home and
returned to and entered the appointed premises, where the officers, looking
through the window, observed defendant A hand small packages over to the
government's stooges who paid money to another defendant. The officers
broke and entered the premises, seized the packages which were found to
contain drugs, arrested all defendants and indicted them for conspiring to
sell unregistered and untaxed drugs in violation of federal law. In the course
of the trial the government was permitted, over objection, to introduce into
evidence a quantity of the drug which had been searched for and seized
without warrants of any kind in defendant A's bedroom at the conclusion of
the episode just described. It was the government's theory that "An officer
who arrests a person for felony committed in his presence may search not
merely the person, but also the place where he is discovered, and other places
in the immediate vicinity which are clearly indicated as having formed part
of the scene of the crime."...
In this fashion the government sought at the first opportunity1"0 to turn
a loosely phrased dictum into an even broader legal principle. The Court at
this time, however, was in no mood to make such inroads upon the Amend-
ment's clear language, and rejected the contention, saying:
Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed
in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that
place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful not-
withstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. [citing
three federal lower court and four state court cases] The search of
114. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
115. Id. at 24.
116. The only cases intervening between the decisions in the Weeks and Agnello
cases were Gouled, Amos and Silverthorne. The first two did not involve arrests. In
Silverthorne where the search was only chronologically incidental, the government's argu-
ment was addressed to the support of the second seizure by urging the validity of the
subpoena and the inability of the corporation to claim immunity under the Fifth Amend-
ment's self-incrimination clause.
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Frank Agnello's house and the seizure of the can of cocaine violated
the Fourth Amendment. 17
But once again, dicta, which were later to be invoked by government
prosecutors, found their way into the Court's opinion, when it said:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things con-
nected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape
from custody, is not to be doubted. [citing Weeks and Carroll]
* * When [Agnello's house] was entered and searched, the con-
spiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and
in custody elsewhere. * * * While the question has never been
directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that
one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant,
except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein. (emphasis added)
[citing Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne and Gouled] * * * Save in
certain cases as an incident to arrest, there is no sanction in the
decisions of the courts, federal or state, for the search of a private
dwelling house without a warrant." 8
Here was the suggestion for the first time, that a house might be searched
without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest-a clear dictum and so
regarded by the Court in acknowledging that the point had never been directly
decided-plus the further suggestion that the contemporaneous commission
of an offense might have some bearing on the question.
With the gradual accumulation of such dicta and the government's press-
ing them in subsequent cases, it is not too surprising that in the course of
time one of them should rise to a principle of decision. It does, indeed,
"prove how a hint becomes a suggestion, is loosely turned into a dictum
and finally elevated to a decision."'" 9 The decision came in the Marron
case in 1927, discussed in the previous section. There, it will be remem-
bered, the officers had a valid warrant to search for and seize liquor and
equipment for its manufacture, and while in the course of executing it,
observed the defendant selling liquor in violation of law. He was arrested
for a felony committed in the presence of the officers and in the course of
a search some liquor as well as certain bills and a ledger, found in a closet on
the premises, were seized. Although the court held the ledger and bills to
have been improperly seized under the warrant, not being particularly
described, the seizure was nevertheless upheld because made as an incident
to the lawful arrest. In its. single paragraph opinion on this point of the
117. 269 U. S. at 33.
118. Id. at 30, 31, 32, and 33.
119. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, - U. S.
at -, 70 Sup. Ct. at 439.
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case,12 ° the Court took note of the fact that the defendant was engaged in a
conspiracy to maintain a nuisance at the very time of arrest, thereby, con-
ferring a right on the officers to search "the place," without a warrant, for
things used to commit the offense, and the ledger and bills were regarded as
falling within that category, citing Agnello and Weeks. 1 ' It is clear that
neither Agnello nor Weeks authorized the result reached, for the square
holding in each of them is that one house may not be searched without a
warrant when an arrest takes place at another house or place of business.
Nor can the result in Marron be sustained on the basis of the dictum in
Weeks which referred only to the permissible scope of search and seizure of
articles on the person at the time of arrest. But the Weeks dictum had
become further embellished in Agnello to the point that the Court in M1arron
could at last refer to a specific passage in that case which talked about the
right to search "the place" as an incident to arrest. So in a one paragraph
opinion the law of search and seizure had been extended, not only beyond the
facts of any decision theretofore rendered by the tribunal, but beyond even
the dicta in all but one of them-Agnello. What is even more important is
that the Court not only forbore discussing the extension, but did not even
acknowledge it!
120. For purposes of reference the entire opinion discussing this point is set out here:
When arrested, Birdsall was actually engaged in a conspiracy to
maintain, and was actually in charge of, the premises where intoxicating
liquors were being unlawfully sold. Every such place is by the National
Prohibition Act declareq to be a common nuisance, the maintenance of
which is punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. § 21, Tit. II, Act of
October 28, 1919, c. 85, 41 STAT. 305, 314 (U. S. C., Tit. 27, § 33). The
officers were authorized to arrest for crime being committed in their
presence, and they lawfully arrested Birdsall. They had a right without
a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and
seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise. Agnello v.
United States, supra, 30; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158;
Weeks v. United States, supra, 392. The closet in which liquor and the
ledger were found was used as a part of the saloon. And, if the ledger
was not as essential to the maintenance of the establishment as were
bottles, liquors and glasses, it was none the less a part of the outfit
or equipment actually used to commit the offense. And, while it was not
on Birdsall's person at the time of his arrest, it was in his immediate
possession and control. The authority of officers to search and seize the
things by which the nuisance was being maintained, extended to all parts
of the premises used for the unlawful purpose. Cf. Sayers v. United
States, 2 F.2d 146; Kirvi Iv. United States, .rupra; United States v.
Kirschenblatt, supra. The bills for gas, electric light, water and tele-
phone services disclosed items of expense; they were convenient, if not
in fact necessary, for the keeping of the accounts; and, as they were
so closely related to the business, it is not unreasonable to consider them
as used to carry it on. It follows that the ledger and bills were law-
fully seized as an incident of the arrest.
Judgment affirmed.
121. Also cited was Carroll v. United States, which is discussed infra note 151, and
there shown to be inopposite.
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If the course'of decision had halted at this point, there would be little
reason for appraising Mr. Justice Jackson's 1949 concern for the second-class
character of Fourth Amendment freedoms because the Marron decision of
1927 seems to have authorized much of what he apparently deplores. But
the course of decision was not so halted, and there is every reason to believe
that "the sting of the Marron case was taken by two later cases, Go-Bart Co.
v. United States, * * * and United States v. LefkowitZ," 122 both decided by
unanimous Courts in 1931 and 1932 respectively.
In Go-Bart 23 federal officers arrested the defendants under a warrant
at their place of business for engaging in the illegal sale of liquor. At the
time of arrest the officers falsely claimed to have a warrant to search the
premises, and forced one defendant to open a desk and safe, proceeded to
ransack the office consisting of a suite of three rooms, and seized a quantity
of liquor, memoranda, books, records, filing cases and other papers. Though
the warrant of arrest was void, the Court regarded the arrest itself as valid
because the officers possessed sufficient information to apprehend the de-
fendants without a warrant. Nevertheless the search of the premises and
seizure of the articles mentioned was condemned and the order of the trial
court denying defendants' motion for their return [presumably based upon
the Court's opinion in Marron] was reversed. In the opinion there is a
return to first principles, including the quotation of the Fourth Amendment,
a reminder that its provisions prohibit general searches, the citation of such
respectable early cases as Boyd and Gouled as well as Weeks and Agnello,
and the statement that "The Amendment is to be liberally construed and all
owe the duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement lest there shall be
impairment of rights for the protection of which it was adopted. '124 But
what of the Marron case? The prosecution had confidently relied on that
decision, indicating that the sole distinction between the two cases was that here
the defendants had simply required more books and papers for the recording
of their illegal activities whereas 'Marron had managed to keep his entirely
within the covers of one ledger along with a few bills. And it is highly
questionable 'from the opinions in the two cases that there actually was any
greater difference between them. However, Marron, rather than'being over-
ruled, was distinguished in the following language: "These things [the bills
and the ledger] were visible and accessible and in the offender's immediate
custody. There was no threat of force or general search or rummaging of the
place." It was also said in Go-Bart: "It is not, and could not be, claimed
that the officers saw conspiracy being committed. And there is no suggestion
that Gowen or Bartels was committing crime when arrested."
122. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. at 609
(1946).
123. 282 U. S. 344 (1931). 124. Id. at 357.
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In Lefkowitz 2 ' the defendants were arrested at their place of business
by federal prohibition agents under a valid arrest warrant issued under a
complaint charging them with a conspiracy to violate the prohibition laws.
Coincident with the arrest the officers, who had no search warrants, searched
the person of one of the defendants, taking certain papers. They then pro-
ceeded thoroughly to search the office itself, including several desks, a cabinet
and a wastebasket. There was no force exhibited, but a large number of
records, papers, bills and memoranda were seized. A motion for the returbl
of the articles was denied by the trial court [again presumably relying on
the Marron decision]. The court of appeals reversed on the authority of
Go-Bart, and on certiorari the Government, seeking to distinguish Go-Bart,
argued that the search and seizure here was proper because at the time of
arrest the defendants were engaged in the commission of the offense charged
in the complaint. In affirming the action of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court said: "It cannot be claimed that they saw conspiracy being committed
or that any understanding, agreement or combination was being had, made or
formed in their presence. Go-Bart Co. v. United States, supra, 357.' '126
In distinguishing Marron the court of appeals had said that "Such a
search and seizure as these officers indulged themselves in is not like that
in Marron v. United States, . . . where things openly displayed to view
were picked up by the officers and taken away at the time the arrest was
made." This language was quoted approvingly by the Court which added on
its own, "The ledger and bills being in plain view were picked up by the
officers as an incident of the arrest.'
27
What was the remaining authority of Marron? Practically none!
In the first place, the statements in the two later cases to the effect that the
Marron records "were visible and accessible," "openly displayed to view,"
and "in plain view" simply do not accord with the recital in the brief Marron
opinion that "The closet in which liquor and the ledger were found was used
as a part of the saloon." It is true, of course, that the utility bills were found
in "plain view" being situated aside the cash register at the bar, but it was the
ledger's fatal recital of the facts of the business that was so damaging to
Marron-afid this, so far from being in "plain view," was actually located in
a closet which had to be searched and rummaged. Secondly, the reliance by
the Court in Marron upon the fact that the defendant, when arrested, "was
actually engaged in a conspiracy," was first thrown in doubt by the denial in
Go-Bart that the officers "saw conspiracy being committed" (although it was
not a conspiracy case), and was finally exploded in Lefkowitz, which was a
conspiracy case, where the Court asserted that "It cannot be claimed that they
125. 285 U. S. 452 (1932).
126. Id. at 463.
127. Id. at 465.
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saw conspiracy being committed or that any understanding, agreement or
combination was being had, made or formed in their presence." Finally, it
should be noted that the opinions in all three cases were written by Mr. Justice
Butler for a substantially similarly constituted Court,12 and that the decisions
in the two later cases evqked no dissenting opinions to challenge departures
from principles established by Marron. Why, then, was Marron not over-
ruled rather than distinguished? Part of the answer is that there still
remained the principle that records in plain view or in the immediate custody
of the arrested defendant-the utility bills-might still be seized without a
warrant. The remainder of the answer is to be found in the Court's reluctance
expressly to overrule a decision, particularly of recent vintage, when it may be
distinguished, even though the process of the distinction may, subsequently,
sap its vitality to a point that nothing remains but the hollow shell of a once-
flourishing legal principle. Many cases have fallen victim to this process
of judicial erosion. In any event, it may be said that by 1932 whatever
serious damage had been inflicted upon Fourth Amendment freedoms by the
decision in Marron had been wholly repaired and the Court had returned to
the principle of liberally construing the Amendment's provisions, so clearly
established in the early decisions in Boyd, Gouled, Weeks and Silverthorne.
Where, then, are the indications to support Mr. Justice Jackson's asser-
tion, so vocally shared by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that Fourth Amendment
freedoms are again in danger? The answer to this question is to be found
in the Court's post-1945 decisions, notably, Davis, 29 Harris"0 and Rabino-
wit. " In each of these cases the Court has returned to the cryptic opinion
of Marron to find authority for the approval of general searches of the place
of arrest with total disregard for the clearly qualifying language of the
Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases which had at least restricted the right of search
and seizure in such cases to the taking of articles which were on the person,
in plain view or in the immediate custody of the defendant at the time of
arrest.
Davis, decided in 1946, involved the conviction of a black market gasoline
dealer under the rationing provisions of the war-time legislation administered
by the Office of Price Administration. Federal officers, who had been
observing the defendant's place of business with suspicion of violation for
some time, purchased some gasoline there. When asked for coupons by one
of the defendant's employee-attendants, they replied that they had none, but
were allowed to keep the gasoline upon paying a substantially increased price.
128. At the time of Go-Bart, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts had replaced
Chief Justice Taft and Justice Sanford, respectively, of the Marrom Court. Justice
Cardozo did not participate.
129. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946).
130. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947).
131. United States v. Rabinowitz, - U. S. -, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950).
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The attendant was thereupon placed under arrest, as was the defendant when
he appeared soon thereafter. A check of the coupon box on the gasoline
pump disclosed a discrepancy which the defendant, when questioned in the
station waiting room, stated was covered by coupons which he had in a
locked inner office. He was asked to unlock the office, and following per-
sistent refusals, finally yielded and admitted the officers who searched the
place and seized a quantity of coupons for the possession of which the de-
fendant was then tried and convicted following the denial of his motion for
their return.
Here were articles the mere possession of which, under the circumstances,
was illegal. Hence, under rule three, they might be seized in the course of a
proper search. But was the search proper? Certainly it was improper under
the decisions in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, leaving aside the question of the
use of force, the coupons being so far from "plain view" that entry into
another part of the premises had to be demanded before their existence was
discovered. Unlike the utility bills which lay in plain sight in Marron, these
coupons were situated more like the ledger in that case, or the records taken
from the desks, filing cabinets and wastebaskets in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz.
The majority opinion refused to review all decisions defining the scope
of "reasonable" searches and seizures, declaring:
• . . they have largely developed out of cases involving the search
and seizure of private papers. We are dealing here not with private
papers or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never
became the private property of the holder but remained at all times
the property of the government and subject to inspection and recall
by it.13
2
Here was a new principle, not previously considered by the cases, (because it
had never been encountered) and one which was to lead to further extension
of the law of search and seizure in the Harris case the following year. It is
difficult, in principle, to see why the government should have any greater
right to seize this property than to seize the contraband liquor in Amos or the
lottery tickets in Weeks, possession of which was likewise unlawful and to
which the government was also entitled-but only when taken in a properly
safeguard search. At a further point in the opinion, in distinguishing Amos,
it was said that the search there involved a "private residence," whereas
"The filling station [in Davis] was a place of business."' 133 If this was to be
made the basis for authorizing what are otherwise unlawful searches, then
Silverthorne, Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, all of which involved searches of
offices, were being overruled, yet the Court failed to mention or discuss them.
The truth of the matter is, of course, that the searches in Silverthorne, Go-Bart
132. 328 U. S. at 587-588.
133. Id. at 592.
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and Lefkowitz were unlawful because made without warrants, regardless of
the character of the place or the articles seized! Two further points of,
criticism with respect to the Davis case are first, that the officers, having had
the defendant's place of business under suspicion and surveillance for a con-
siderable period of time, had no excuse for their failure to apply for war-
rants to make the search, and second, had they made application, it would
have been denied because Davis' offense was merely a misdemeanor," and the
Search Warrant Act authorizes the issuance of warrants only in cases in-
volving a felony.3 3 We are thus faced with the incongruous result, noted in
Ir. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, "that a search which could not be justified
under a search warrant is lawful without it.""'
It was to be hoped that Davis, like Marron, was simply a temporary
aberration from the otherwise well defined path which the Court has followed
in the development of Fourth Amendment principles, particularly since it
had been decided by less than a majority of the full Court."17 These hopes
were dashed by the 1947 decision in Harris which further extended the
departure. There, five agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation went to
the defendant's home and arrested him under the authority of two arrest
warrants charging him with using the mails to defraud and having caused a
forged check to be shipped in interstate commerce. The arrest occurred in
the living-room of the defendant's four room apartment and an agent was
then assigned to search each room in an effort to discover "any means that
might have been used to commit these two crimes, such as burglar tools, pens, or
anything that could be used in a confidence game of this type."" 38  Certainly
this was fair sport under Marron as recently resurrected by the Davis decision.
The search was a thorough one, consuming five hours, and while it did not
disclose any of the objects for which it was undertaken, there was found in a
bureau drawer an envelope marked "George Harris, personal papers," which
contained a number of forms issued by draft boards under the Selective
Service Act. It was for the possession of these documents that the present
134. The proceedings were based upon the Act of June 28, 1940, as amended by the Act
of May 31, 1941, and by § 301 of the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942.
Sec. 2 (a) (5) provides:
(5) Any person who willfully performs any act prohibited, or willfully
fails to perform any act required by, any provision of this subsection
(a) or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, whether heretofore or
hereafter issued, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon con-
viction, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
one year, or both.
135. 40 STAT. 217, 228, 18 U. S. C. § 612.
136. 328 U. S. at 595.
137. justice Douglas wrote the opinion which was concurred in by Justices Black,
Reed and Burton. Justices Frankfurter, Murphy and Rutledge dissented. Justice Jack-
son did not participate and the Chief Justiceship was vacant by virtue of the recent death
of Chief Justice Stone.
138. 331 U. S. at 148-149.
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proceeding was instituted. Harris' motion to suppress the forms as evidence
was denied and he was convicted. Admittedly something more than the
previous year's decision was necessary if the Supreme Court was to affirm
this action, for the majority in Davis had carefully noted that "there was no
general exploratory search. Only the contraband coupons were demanded;
only coupons were taken."'13 9 What was this "something more" that the
Court was able to muster in order to affirm? It was the old saw of an
"offense in the course of commission," which had been one of the principal
grounds of decision in Marron, but so clearly discredited in Go-Bart and
finally rejected in Lefkowitz. Chief Justice Vinson reasoned that here was a
valid search under Davis, in the course of which government agents discovered
property to which the government was entitled to possession, and "In keeping
the draft cards in his custody petitioner was guilty of a serious and continuing
offense against the laws of the United States. [Hence] A crime was thus
being committed in the very presence of the agents conducting the search."' 40
This theory, so clearly discredited in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, had not even
been invoked in support of the decision in Davis, and yet it was here advanced
as the principal basis for extending the broadened Fourth Amendment
principle announced by that case. Again, the result was reached only by a
closely divided Court-five to four this time, with all nine justices participat-
ing. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquent dissents in both Davis and
Harris seeking to call the majority's attention to the facts of history, the
purpose of the Amendment and the actual rules of decision in the earlier cases
which were being so obviously disregarded. He best epitomized the thesis
of this article when, in Harris, he said:
• . . one's views regarding circumstances like those here presented
ultimately depend upon one's understanding of the history and the
function of the Fourth Amendment. A decision may turn on
whether one gives that Amendment a place second to none in the Bill
of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a serious
-impediment in the war against crime.14'
Before Rabinowitz, the third in the trio of recent cases mentioned as
marking the relegation of Fourth Amendment freedoms to second class
constitutional rights, four cases arising in 1948 indicated a return by the
Court to the principle of liberal construction, just as Go-Bart and Lefkowitz
had neutralized the Marron decision.
The first of these cases was Johnson v. United States,'42 where federal
agents, armed with no warrants of any kind, at the call of and in company
with the police of the City of Seattle, went to the defendant's hotel, pursuant
139. 328 U. S. at 592.
140. 331 U. S. at 155.
141. Id. at 157.
142. 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
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to a tip received from an informer that the defendant was in her room
smoking opium. The officers stood in the hall outside defendant's room
where they could detect the odor of burning opium, knocked on the door,
demanded entry and were admitted by the defendant following a slight delay.
The officers told the defendant to "consider yourself under arrest because
we are going to search this room," and in the search that followed, they
found and seized a quantity of opium and smoking apparatus. A motion to
suppress the evidence prior to trial was overruled and Johnson was con-
victed. In reversing the conviction the Court pointed out that the entry to
the defendant's room had been made under the color of and in submission
to authority without a waiver of any kind on the part of the defendant, hence
was a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment as construed in Amos, when
accomplished without a search warrant. A true appreciation of the Amend-
ment's purposes is reflected in the following language of Mr. Justice Jack-
son's opinion:
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of
grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached
on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield
to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or governmental enforcement agent.
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it
may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be
dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered
for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience of the
officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and
present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very convinc-
ing circumstances, certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitu-
tional requirement. No suspect was fleeing or likely to take
flight.14 3
The attempt of the government to sustain the search as incident to a lawful
arrest, despite the lack of a warrant, failed when the Court concluded that the
arrest itself was invalid. Arrest may be made without a warrant only when
a crime is committed in the presence of the officer, or for a felony if the
officer has reasonable cause to believe the defendant guilty of such an
offense. Here, it was pointed out, the officers had no reasonable ground
for believing that the defendant had been smoking the opium until they had
made their unlawful entry and found that she was alone in the room. The
decision was once again five to four with Mr. Justice Douglas switching over
and joining the four man minority of Harris (Frankfurter, Murphy, Douglas
and Rutledge). Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black, Reed and Burton
143. Id. at 14-15.
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dissented without an opinion. A substantially similar result had been reached
a month earlier in United States v. Di Re.1
44
The decision in Trupiano v. United States'4 is even more encouraging
to those who hold in high regard the Fourth Amendment's freedoms. In that
case federal agents had known for a period of three weeks that the defendants
were illegally manufacturing liquor. One of the agents had been actually
employed by the defendants to assist them in their illegal enterprise, and
was thus enabled to pass along information to his colleagues. On the basis
of his advice that a particular shipment would be removed from the building
on a designated date, other agents surrounded the place at night prepared
to make arrests. No warrants of any kind had been obtained. One agent
peeked through a hole in the wall of the building and observed one of the
defendants operating the still. A felony having been committed in his
presence, he immediately entered and placed the defendant under arrest and
seized the still. Other agents later seized other equipment and a quantity of
the liquor. Here was a legal arrest, notwithstanding the lack of a warrant,
but what of the seizure? Davis would seem to require the affirmance of the
action of the trial court which had denied a motion for the suppression of the
evidence, since the arrest, being valid, would seem to justify the search and
seizure of the fruits and the means by which the crime had been committed,
and Harris would seemingly have permitted the seizure of even more than
was actually taken. Once again, however, the shifting vote of Mr. Justice
Douglas brought forth the "judicial miracle of the four becoming five,"
and the trial court's action was reversed. The seizure was declared to have
been invalid without a warrant on much the same theory as in Johnson
(which was cited and reaffirmed), namely that "there was an abundance
of time during which such a warrant could have been secured."' 46 Far from
being unanimous, however, the decision precipitated a biting dissent from
the pen of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, who was joined by Justices Black, Reed
and Burton. Viewed in the light of his opinion for the majority in Harris,
it is not too difficult to understand the Chief Justice's inability to go along
with the new majority. Defending the government's action, he said: "The
seizure was not preceded by an exploratory search. The objects seized were
in plain sight. To insist upon the use of a search warrant in situations where
the issuance of such warrants can contribute nothing to the preservation of
the rights which the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect, serves only
to open an avenue of escape for those guilty of crime and to menace the
effective operation of government which is an essential precondition to the
144. 332 U. S. 581 (1948).
145. 334 U. S. 699 (1948).
146. Id. at 706.
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'eisterice of all civil liberties.' 1 7 What this statement overlooks, of course,
is that the Amendment was intended to protect the'innocent and the guilty
alike. 'There can be no dual standard in its application. To insist upon the
issuance of warrants in all cases where the Amendment demands them is the
only way to preserve the rights secured.
Further assurance that the Court was becoming increasingly alert to the
Fourth Amendment's proiection of privacy was furnished in the McDonald
case' 14 which involved the arrest and conviction of a numbers racketeer in the
District of Columbia. For several months District police had kept McDonald
under surveillance and on the day of the arrest they were outside his rooming
house where they heard the sound of an adding machine being operated.
Suspecting that it was being used in the computation of the receipts and having
no warrants of any kind, the police forced their entry into the house through
a window which led into the landlady's room. They identified themselves
and then proceeded into the hall where, by standing on a chair and looking
over the transom, they were able to observe the defendant in the course of the
activity they had suspected, surrounded by numbers slips and money. They
demanded entry and placed him under arrest, seizing the adding machines,
slips and money. A motion to suppress the evidence was denied and, fol-
lowing his conviction, McDonald applied for certiorari which was granted.
Once again, the prosecution sought to sustain the search and seizure on the
lawful arrest. Though the legality of the arrest is doubtful the court proceeded
to treat it as valid, but nevertheless declared the search and seizure to be
without authority since, as in Johnson and Trupiano, ample time existed for
the procurement of warrants. This time the decision was six to three, with
Mr. Justice Black concurring only in the result. Mr. Justice Burton dissented,
contending that the arrest'was doubtless lawful (defendant, as a roomer,
had no protectable interest in keeping the police from the hall), and a crime
having been committed in the presence of the officers, they could seize all
that was in plain view.
These cases were indeed encouraging signs vouching for the integrity
of the Fourth Amendment's freedoms, and by the end of 1948 it could
reasonably be hoped that Davis and Harris would follow in the wake of
Marron as the gradual process of judicial erosion was at work. Throughout
the year 1949 no search-incident-to-arrest cases came to the Court, but two
other events occurred which were destined to affect the question-the untimely
deaths of Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge, both of whom had
been consistently identified with the effort to return the Court to first
principles in these cases. Davis, Harris, Johnson and Trupiano had all been
decided by the narrow margin of one vote, and the result in all five cases
147. Id. at 714-715.
148. 335 U. S. 451 (1948).
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had been resolved by the shifting position taken by Mr. justice Douglas, the
remaining eight Justices being firmly committed to their respective positions.
Unquestionably therefore the positions to be taken by the new appointees to
the Court could either prolong and maintain the uncertainty pending the
clarification of Mr. Justice Douglas' views, or could throw it conclusively
either way.
With startling suddenness in 1950, the Court in the Rabinowitz case not
only returned to the Marron case as the basis of appraising the validity of
searches and seizures, but expressly overruled Trupiano and cast serious doubt
on Johnson and McDonald. Rabinowitz was a stamp dealer who was
suspected of making forged overprints on otherwise valid postage stamps,
thereby increasing their value, and selling them as genuine. A government
agent was sent to his place of business to purchase some of the stamps, and
an examination of them confirmed suspicions. Ten days after the purchase,
and a full week after the receipt showing the overprints to be forgeries, an
arrest warrant was obtained and served on the defendant at his place of
business, a one-room office. Although the arresting officers had no search
warrant, they devoted an hour and a half to a complete search of his office
desk, filing cabinets and safe, and seized a quantity of stamps which were
found inside these pieces of furniture. This is precisely what had been done
in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, and which the Court had declared to be in violation
of the Amendment. Nevertheless Mr. Justice Minton uses Marron as his
principal authority (although he also relies on Harris, as an a fortiori source)
declaring that he does not consider it to have been drained of "contemporary
vitality" by Go-Bart and Lefkowitz and continuing:
Those cases condemned general exploratory searches, which can-
not be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant. In the
instant case the search was not general or exploratory for whatever
might be turned up. Specificity was the mark of the search and
seizure here.149
But is this truly a distinguishing feature of the cases? It is submitted that it
is not. Rabinowitz was charged with "selling, possessing and concealing"
forged stamps. Officers in search of evidence to support that charge need
only find and seize stamps. In Go-Bart and Lefkowitz the charges were
that the defendants had been selling liquor illegally, with the additional charge
in the latter that there was also a conspiracy to do so. Evidence of a crime
of that sort may be established only by the collection of the type of data
contained in the varied books, records and papers which were seized. Hence
the searches in those two cases were more general than that in Rabinowitz
only in the sense that more generalized data constituted the evidence which
constituted proof of the offense charged. Also resurrected from Marron as
149. - U. S. at -, 70 Sup. Ct. at 433-434.
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well as Harris was the notion that the search might be sustained on the added
ground that the officers had reasonable cause to believe that a felony was
being committed in their very presence-the act of possessing the forged
stamps. This concept, it will be recalled, had been completely rejected by the
Court in Lefkowitz. When he came to consider the fact that the officers in
Rabinowitz had had more than ample time and information to make application
for a warrant, however, Mr. Justice Minton encountered the square and
recently created obstacle of the Trupiano case, which is cavalierly dismissed
as "A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured
whenever practicable,"'O and hence, overruled. The following language in
his opinion proposes a different view of "ample time":
Whether there was time may well be dependent upon considera-
tions other than the ticking off of minutes or hours. The judgment
of the officers as to when to close the trap on a criminal committing
crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to believe
is committing a felony is not determined solely upon whether there
was time to procure a search warrant.
The conclusive answer to this proposition is that the period of a week to ten
days involved in Rabinowitz is not a matter of "minutes or hours." It will
be time enough to deal with the matters of "minutes and hours" when cases
presenting facts of that nature arise, and in the meantime the Court should
observe the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the impartial hand of a
magistrate be interposed between the privacy of an individual and the
impetuous action of police officers, whose rank, promotion and salaries are
too often determined on the basis of their accomplishments. But there is a
further solution to the problem which concerns Mr. Justice Minton. The
Court in the past has always been ready to recognize that if matters of
"minutes or hours" are indispensably involved in the administration of
justice, the Fourth Amendment does not demand the impossible, but permits
reasonable exceptions where the facts of the case truly warrant exceptional
treatment. General statements to this effect are to be found throughout the
opinions, as well as in some of the excerpts quoted in this article, but the
principal application of the doctrine is to be found in the cases involving
searches of automobiles, vessels and other movable vehicles. Here the same
considerations of practicality and necessity are presented which justify the
search of the person without a warrant as an incident to arrest. The excep-
tion was recognized as early as 1925 in Carroll v. United States,'"' where
prohibition agents halted the defendant on the highway, searched his automo-
bile and, finding a quantity of liquor, seized it and placed the defendant
under arrest, having no warrants of any kind. The Court sustained the
150. Id. at -, 70 Sup. Ct. at 413.
151. 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
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search when it was shown that the officers had had previous information
that the defendant was engaged in running illicit liquor from Detroit (where
it was imported from Canada) to Grand Rapids, Michigan; that they had
previously talked with the defendant in Grand Rapids and arranged to pur-
chase liquor from him [the sale having failed to materialize as a result of the
,defendant's suspicions concerning the officers' identity being aroused] ; that
the officers had unsuccessfully given chase to the defendant on the road
between Detroit and Grand Rapids on a previous occasion; and finally, that
they were able clearly to identify him and his car on the day of the seizure.
All of these facts combined to afford reasonable cause for the initial appre-
hension of the defendant, and the search without warrant was then justified
in view of the practicalities of the situation-the liquor being in a moving
vehicle which might be driven away if the officers were required at this point
to halt their activities and obtain a search warrant. Here, certainly, is a case
of "minutes or hours," as well as the prospect of a fleeing suspect to which
Mr. Justice Jackson refers in his opinion in the Johnson case. And the Court
responded to the situation. Here is an exception which is acknowledged by
all the members of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter having referred to it
as recently as in his dissenting opinion in the Rabinowitz case, but calling
attention to the fact that it has limited application, and was certainly inap-
plicable there. The exception was applied as recently as 1949 in Brinegar v.
United States,'52 although three of the Justices, while acknowledging the con-
trolling authority of Carroll, nevertheless dissented from its application to the
particular facts of that case.
In summarizing the cases in this section, what can be said to be the
present state of the law respecting searches and seizures occurring as incidents
of arrest? With what degree of certainty may we predict the results of future
cases ? In answer to the first question it is to be said, regrettably, that Marron,
once sapped of all but the very dregs of its life blood by the decisions in
Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, has been restored to full flower, and that the flow
of the cases in the meanderings of the judicial process have directed the
current to the other bank of the stream where, perhaps, Go-Bart and Lefkowitg
will, if they have not already done so, crumble and fall victim to the gradual
process of erosion. To be sure, Mr. Justice Minton's opinion speaks of the
particular facts of Rabinowitz and cautions that cases in this field must each
be decided on their own peculiar facts-a kind of ad hoc administration of
the Fourth Amendment-but the truly discouraging passage of the decision
is the statement that Marron is not to be taken to have been disowned by the
Court in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz. Any remaining doubt which had been
cast upon the authority of Harris by the intervening decisions in Johnson,
152. 338 U. S. 160 (1949).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Trupiano and McDonald is likewise dispelled. The principles of Marron,
thus revived and restored, can, and possibly will, lead to serious encroachments
upon Fourth Amendment freedoms. Thus, if the notion of "constructive
possession," relied upon in Harris to justify the search of the entire apartment
when the defendant was arrested in the living room, be extended, it is not too
far fetched to say that the principles of Weeks, Silverthorne and Agnello
may go by the board. For in each of those cases, where defendants were
arrested at one place and their homes or offices located elsewhere were
searched contemporaneously, it might be said with equal force that they were
nonetheless "in possession" of these places. Certainly the defendants in
those cases were neither more nor less "in possession" of the places searched
than Harris was "in possession" of his bedroom at the time of the discovery
of the draft cards. Obviously the principle of cases like Davis, Harris and
Rabinowitz puts too much of a premium on the sheer coincidence that valid
arrests take place in the home or office; for had these arrests occurred else-
where, as in Weeks, Silverthorne and Agnello; there is no doubt that the
controlling authority of those earlier cases would have prohibited the searches
and seizures approved in the later cases.
What of predictability? It is clear from the position taken by Mr.
Justice Minton, and shared by Mr. Justice Clark, who concurred with him in
Rabinowitz, that the votes of Justices Murphy and Rutledge have been effec-
tively displaced, leaving only Justices Frankfurter and Jackson of the former
group which consistently opposed the principle of general search of the place
upon arrest. It is possible that Mr. Justice Douglas, had he participated in
Rabinowitz, would have joined with the latter group as he did in Johnson,
Trupiano and McDonald. Mvir. Justice Black dissented in Rabinowitz, not
on constitutional grounds, but upon considerations of policy in sound judicial
administration. Hence it appears that, with respect to the constitutional issue,
a clear working majority of at least six Justices (Vinson, Black, Reed, Bur-
ton, Clark and Minton) is now committed to the principle of Rabinowitz, per-
mitting search of the premises at large without a warrant when a lawful arrest
occurs there. Two of the Justices (Frankfurter and Jackson) would insist
that any such search is in violation of the Fourth Amendment when conducted
without a warrant, and would restrict the unwarranted search and seizure
to that which is necessary to make the arrest effective, an admitted exception
based upon necessity but limited to the person and the area in his immediate
custody. Mr. Justice Douglas might be expected to join them, at least in
cases where time permits resort to the warrant process. This poses a bleak
outlook for those who share the Frankfurter-Jackson view that Fourth
Amendment freedoms have been relegated to second class constitutional
rights. However, history gives at least one cause for hope. What was once
done by a unaninous Court in Marron was soon thereafter undone by equally
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unanimous Courts in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz. Certainly the prospect is not
so bleak today as it was in 1927. We have the persuasive and painstaking
dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Davis, Harris and
Rabinowita to call the Court's attention to its disregard for the teachings
of history, the purpose of the framers of the Amendment and the early cases." 3
The Remedial Problem
The cases reviewed in the two preceding sections have abundantly demon-
strated that the Fourth Amendment is no less vulnerable to infringement than
other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Over-zealous law enforcement officers
are not apt to pause in the course of their duties to evaluate carefully, or even
consider the individual's freedoms sought to be secured by that article, unless
some powerfully restrictive inhibition is imposed upon them to do so. What
form of remedy should be made available to the victims of unreasonable
searches and seizures? We know from the Entick case that one so offended
may seek redress in a civil action for damages against the transgressor.
Since 1921 the Criminal Code has imposed criminal sanctions in the form
of a fine not to exceed $1,000 for the first such offense and a similar fine or
imprisonment for not more than one year for subsequent offenses when
committed by federal officers.' But the mere handful of reported cases
recording resort to these remedies bears mute testimonial to their inadequacy.
To serve as an effective deterrent upon the activities of law enforcement
officers, thereby achieving the constitutional protection intended, the inhibit-
ing influence must be a remedy that more directly affects them in the accom-
plishment of their tasks. The remedy most effectively designed to accom-
plish this end is that of permitting the victim of an unreasonable search and
seizure to petition the court before whom the criminal enforcement proceed-
ings will be heard for the return or suppression of the evidence so obtained.
This device penalizes the law enforcement officer in a manner which is most
meaningful to him, and the mere availability of the remedy should serve to
instill in him a wholesome respect for the Amendment's requirements. This
is not unreasonably to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to convert
the Amendment into a shield for the protection of crime, but is simply to
assure respect for its most salutary mandate, and the fulfillment of its purpose.
The remedy of excluding the evidence seized in the course of unreason-
able searches and seizures has been applied in the federal courts since 1914
when it was first adopted in the Weeks case, following an earlier and seem-
153. It is not to be overlooked, of course, that this may be an ill rather than a good
omen. No one on the Court in Marron called these facts forcefully to its attention, and
its subsequent action in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz may indicate that Marron would have
gone the other way if someone had done so.
154. 18 U. S. C. § 2236, formerly 18 U. S. C. § 53.
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ingly inconsistent start. It had previously been held in Adams v. New York, 5
that upon the basis of common law principles of evidence, where the claim
of Fourth Amendment infringement came in the form of an objection to
evidence in the course of a trial, the court was not required to halt the
proceedings to make collateral inquiry into the issue concerning the manner
in which evidence, otherwise admissible, had been obtained. The Boyd case,
which had been previously decided, was distinguished on the ground that the
defendants there had made their objection to the "unreasonable search" at
the very time it was proposed to be made-when the government moved for
a court order demanding the production of the incriminating documents. For
some time following Adams there was doubt wlether the Boyd rule would be
of any practical significance, since an individual would seldom have a court
at hand at the time an unreasonable search and seizure was proposed or
undertaken, and could hardly be expected to halt it in that fashion. If, at
the same time, he was to be foreclQsed by the Adams rule from seeking redress
at the time of the trial of the substantive offense, what interim remedy was
available? The answer to this question proved to be the device utilized in
Weeks, a motion prior to trial for the return of the articles wrongfully seized.
It was thereafter held in Amos that such a motion did not come too late when
it was made after the jury had been impanelled and sworn but before the
taking of testimony had begun. On the same day the Court held in Gouled
that the defendant would be excused from petitioning for the return of
paper which the government agent had taken by stealth and might object to
its introduction in evidence at the trial since that was the first intimation he
had had of its illegal seizure. The Court remarked that "A rule of practice
must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional
right."'- 6 In Agnello, the defendant objected at the trial to the introduction
in evidence of the can of cocaine which had been taken from his bedroom
without his knowledge. His objection was sustained and the Court's state-
ment concerning the necessity for pre-trial motion is even more sweeping:
Where, by uncontroverted facts, it appears that a search and
seizure were made in violation of the Fourth Amendment, there is no
reason why one whose rights have been so violated and who is sought
to be incriminated by evidence so obtained, may not invoke protec-
tion of the Fifth Amendment immediately and without any ap-
plication for the return of the thing seized.' 1 7
We have already seen that the Agnello Court was considerably given to the
utterance of dicta, and the statement just quoted seems to fall into that
category, since under the Gouled decision, Agnello's ignorance of the seizure
155. 192 U. S. 585 (1903).
156. 255 U. S. 298, 313 (1921).
157. 269 U. S. 20, 34 (1925).
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prior to the time of the drug was offered in evidence was a sufficient basis
for sustaining his objection. The issue reappeared two years later in Segurola
v. United States1 " when the Court seemingly reaffirmed the requirement of a
pre-trial motion, citing Adams, and defining the rule as follows:
This principle is that, except where there has been no opportunity
to present the matter in advance of trial, (citing Gouled, Amos, and
Agnello), a court, when engaged in trying a criminal case, will not
take notice of the manner in which witnesses have possessed them-
selves of papers or other articles of personal property, which are
material and properly offered in evidence, because the court wiU not
in trying a criminal case permit a collateral issue to be raised as to
the source of competent evidence.1 9
But the defendants in Segurola made no objection to the evidence at the
time of its introduction,16 and only after the liquor had been admitted in
evidence, and at the close of the government's case, did they move to strike
it from the evidence.
There have been no cases subsequent to Segurola involving the precise
issue of the necessity for making a pre-trial motion for return or suppression
of evidence. In all the later cases defense counsel have made seasonable
motions, and this practice has now been codified by Rule 41(e) of the new
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1" The provisions of that section, so
far as they bear upon the question, provide that "The motion shall be made
before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its
discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing." Thus the courts
are left free to determine whether the individual must sacrifice freedoms
under the Fourth (and usually also the Fifth) Amendment to the dictates of
a rule of procedure. Clearly a rule of procedure cannot prevail over the rule
of exclusion if the latter is a mandate of the Amendment itself. But does the
Amendment so mandate? The Court has never had occasion to pass on this
last question,'6 2 but the clear intimation of Wolf v. Colorado is that the
answer would be in the negative.
The Wolf case involved a state prosecution of a state crime in which
evidence, seized by state officers in the course of an invalid search, was
introduced over the objection of the defendant. Following his conviction in
the state courts the defendant was granted certiorari and argued before the
Supreme Court that his conviction under these circumstances was a denial of
158. 275 U. S. 106 (1927).
159. Id. at 111-112.
160. There was no objection, irrelevant for our purposes, that the evidence had not
been properly identified.
161. 18 U. S. C. following § 687.
162. The Segurola case is not considered to have raised the issue since no objection
was made to the introduction of the evidence.
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due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. His theory,
of course, proceeded upon the premise that the Fourth Amendment's freedoms
are embraced within the term "liberty" found in the Due Process Clause of
the later Amendment, a proposition which the Court had not previously
decided. Having only recently rejected the notion that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth was intended to incorporate the entire first eight
amendments in Adamson v. California,'63 the Court was required to determine
whether the interest secured by the Fourth is so fundamental as to be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" within the doctrine of Palko v. Con-
necticut.6 4 Because of the widespread interest engendered by the Adamson
decision, the Court's opinion in Wolf was expectantly awaited. When an-
nounced in 1949, it expressed the unanimous conclusion of the Court that the
Fourteenth did incorporate the Fourth Amendment freedoms, but the Justices
divided five to four over the question of the effect of this conclusion, with the
result that Wolf's conviction was affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the majority (including Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Reed, Jackson
and Burton) reasoned that while the conclusion reached would certainly dis-
able "a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy
(as to) run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment, * * * (at
the same time) the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a
different order,"' 65 and decided that the states need not adopt the federal rule
of excluding the evidence as an enforcemenf device; civil or criminal sanctions
against the offending officers will seemingly suffice. The fact, observed in
the opinions, that thirty states have rejected the Weeks rule while only 17
adhere to it must have been a strong consideration in the case.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter reviewed the history of the federal rule as
first announced in Weeks, and said of it:
It was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Congres-
sional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The decision
was a matter of judicial implication.
If Congress under its legislative powers were to pass a statute
purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine (-we) would then be faced
with the problem 6f the respect to be accorded the legislative judg-
ment on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have
been forced to depend upon ourown.' 6
Mr. Justice Black,'in his concurring opinion, went even further and
crossed the unreached bridge, saying, "I agree with what appears to be a plain
implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not 4
163. 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
164. 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
165. 338 U. S. at -, 69 Sup. Ct. at 1361.
166. Id. at -, 69 Sup. Ct at 1364.
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command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evi-
dence which Congress might negate,"1" 7 a statement which he reiterated in his
dissenting opinion in the recent Rabinowitz case.
Justices Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge dissented, each writing opinions.
Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion opens with the statement "It is disheartening
to find so much that is right in an opinion which seems to me so fundamentally
wrong."16  To this, the writer would add his own opinion that it is also
disheartening to find the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter whose dissenting opinions in Davis, Harris and Rabinowitz have
reflected such fundamental convictions respecting the Amendment's freedoms,
as well as a full appreciation of its history and purposes.
Each of the dissenters agreed in full with the majority (as did Mr. Justice
Black) that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures barred by the Fourth; and they agreed among themselves, contrary
to the view adopted by the majority and Mr. Justice Black, that the federal
exclusionary rule is a mandate of the Amendment itself, not simply a judicially
created rule of evidence. Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in particular em-
phasizes the ineffectiveness of the civil and criminal remedies to which
the individual must now turn if he is to seek redress for the action of state
officials who invade his constitutional right of privacy, and points to the
glaring dearth of cases in this field in support of his position. It is highly
unlikely, as he says, that the prosecuting attorney who has participated in or
directed the execution of unreasonable searches and seizures, will then under-
take to prosecute himself or his subordinates for having done so. The civil
remedy of a damage action is even less calculated to achieve appropriate
redress or constitutional law enforcement in this area for the reasons which
Mr. Justice Murphy so clearly sets forth. Only by adopting the rule of
exclusion will the courts make Fourth Amendment freedoms as meaningful as
it is within their power to do so. But the question persists, is the adoption of
the exclusionary.rule an implied mandate of the Amendment itself ?
It is true, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter says, that the Amendment does not
explicitly require its adoption. But certainly it is a permissible device to be
utilized in its administration-one which the Amendment, reasonably con-
strued, permits. The Court shows no disposition to abandon it, for as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter says, "we stoutly adhere to it."' 69 And Congress, so far
from negating it, has not only acquiesed in it for more than thirty-five years,
but has recently codified it in the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is, therefore, a principle which has been reasonably implied from the
Amendment's language, based upon its history and purpose, and designed to
167. Id. at -, 69 Sup. Ct. at 1367.
168. 338 U. S. at - , 69 Sup. Ct. at 1369.-
169. Id. at -, 69 Sup. Ct. at 1362.
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achieve that purpose. Yet we know from the review of the cases in the
preceding sections that notwithstanding its adoption and application by the
federal courts, instances continue to arise in which federal officers, not fully
restrained by it, violate freedoms the Amendment was intended to protect.
These cases are ample evidence upon which to sustain a judgment not merely
to retain the federal rule, but to regard it as an implied mandate of the Amend-
ment itself, to be applied for the purpose of at least promoting its objectives.
The adoption of the rule would certainly seem to be necessary if we are to
give the Amendment a "place second to none in the Bill of Rights," to borrow
a Frankfurter phrase from Harris, and at the same time prohibit activity
which "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words," to use the
language of Mr. Justice Holmes in Silverthorne. The Court's earlier state-
ments in Goided and Agnello to the effect that a technical rule of procedure
should not be permitted to prevail over constitutional rights, while dicta,
were nevertheless considered judgments of the issue and permitted the Court
in each of those cases to make an exception to the rule's requirement that
the motion for return or suppression of the evidence be made prior to trial.
What, by way of summary, may be said to be the implications of the
Wolf case upon the remedial problem? First, it may be said with considerable
assurance that the Court has supplied us with the answer to the question
previously raised in connection with the language in Segurola which was
seemingly in conflict with the dicta in Gouled and Agnello concerning the
necessity for raising the search and seizure issue prior to trial. If the federal
rule of exclusion is not an implied mandate of the Amendment, it may con-
tinue to be applied, even in federal cases to deprive the defendant of his
right to raise that defense in the course of trial if he has failed seasonably
to seek redress by other methods. Second, and of more far reaching con-
sequence, is the fact that individuals will not be accorded the most effective
means of redress for deprivation of Fourth Amendment freedoms at the
hands of state officers-an area in which potential harm through invasion
is probably far more apt to occur than in the federal field of law enforce-
ment.17 0 Finally, the Wolf decision throws much doubt on the issue of ad-
missibility of evidence in a federal case which has been seized in the course of
an illegal search conducted by state officers. It had been generally assumed
since the decision in Byars v. United States'7' that such evidence would be
admissible, although the point actually decided there was that where federal
officials actually participate in a state search, the evidence was federally-
obtained to a degree calling for the application of the general federal rule
of exclusion. The doctrine as well as its limitations have been acknowledged.
170. See particularly the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy on this point in
Wolf.
171. 273 U. S. 28 (1927). 
-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in subsequent cases,172 and a clear decision on the point was avoided in
Lustig v. United States,"7 3 decided simultaneously with Wolf. The Court
there, in a split decision, held in a judgment announced by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, that where a federal officer came to the place of the illegal search
as it was being concluded by state officers and selected evidence from among
the articles seized he had participated in the search to a point that required
the evidence to be returned to the defendant pursuant to his seasonably filed
motion. In his opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter refused to consider the
admissibility of such evidence when "secured by state authorities [and]
turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."'1 4  Mr. Justice
Black concurred only in the result. Mr. Justice Murphy, in an opinion in
which Justices Douglas and Rutledge concurred, also approved of the result,
but stated that he would go further and on the basis of his dissenting views
in Wolf, would answer the question which Mr. Justice Frankfurter re-
served-by holding such evidence to be inadmissible even in the absence of
official federal participation. The Chief justice and Justices Reed, Burton
and Jackson dissented, contending that the activities of the federal officer
in Lustig did not constitute participation, and hence, they would admit the
evidence so obtained.
CONCLUSIONS
There is, indeed, ample evidence upon which to sustain the assertion that
Fourth Amendment freedoms have become, or are at least in danger of be-
coming, second class constitutional rights. Beginning with the 1946 decision
in Zap, we have seen a series of cases which have made substantial inroads
upon the Amendment when it is viewed in the light of history, purpose and
the earlier cases interpreting its provisions. Papers of a character which
render their amenability to seizure doubtful even under a proper search,
have not only been seized, but have been taken without warrants at all, and
the Court has approved. The search-incidental-to-arrest cases have demon-
strated an alarming tendency to return to the wholly discredited principles of
Marron, permitting search at large of the place of arrest, and the seizure of
any incriminating evidence found, whether relating to the subject of the
arrest as in Davis and Rabinowitz, or some wholly unexpected windfall as in:
Harris. And finally, there is the discouraging note of Wolf advising us that
violations of whatever remaini ng rights we may have are hot to be redressed.
by the very remedy 'which is best adapted to the accomplishment of tie.
Amendment's" objectives.
172. McNabb v. United- States,- 318-U.- S, 332-4-1943)-;-edman -v.-United-States,.-322
U. S. 487 (1944)..- - '
173. 338 U. S. 74, 69 Sup. Ci. 1372 (1949).'
174. Id. at -, 69 Sup. Ct. at 1374.
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It is to be acknowledged, of course, that in its handling of these cases
the Court is confronted with the competing demands of two policies, extremely
difficult if, indeed, possible to reconcile. On the one hand there is the
interest in privacy which history tells us was the principal concern of the
Amendment's framers. On the other is society's interest in the suppression
of crime-an interest which is obtaining its fair share of public concern as
measured by today's headlines.175 But, "any community must choose between
the impairment of its power to punish crime and such evils as arise from its
uncontrolled prosecution,"''17 in other words, "we must consider the two
objects of desire, both of which we cannot have, and make up our minds
which to choose.' 7 7 In the proposal and adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
that choice was made for us', and if it is found that it has been a poor one, we
should resort to constitutional means to correct it.
175. See New York Times of Thursday, February 16, 1950, page 1, cols. 2 and 3
reporting the speech of President Truman to a Washington meeting of federal, state and
municipal law enforcement officers, bearing the headline "Truman Pledges Aid to Cam-
paign Against Forces of 'Vice and Greed.'" Significantly, the story reports that the
President "warned, however, that there must be no weakening of the Bill of Rights."
176. Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kaplan, 89 F.2d 869, 871 (2d Cir. 1937).
177. Mr. Justice Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 25 SPRING 1950 Number 3
































The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by
THE INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Editorial and Publication Office: Indiana University School of Law
Bloomington, Indiana
